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EXCLUSIVE OF WHAT?  THE 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE 
1970 “METLAKATLA” 
AMENDMENT TO PL 280 
ANDY HARRINGTON* 
This Article examines the legal and historical contexts of the 1970 
“Metlakatla” amendment to PL 280.  This amendment is frequently 
relied upon by proponents of a divestiture interpretation of PL 
280—an interpretation that PL 280 left the affected Indian Tribes 
within mandatory PL 280 states with no residual civil or criminal ju-
risdiction.  The author argues that the conventional reliance upon 
that amendment to support a divestiture interpretation is based on 
flawed premises and that a more complete analysis of the language, 
background, and legislative history materials (both state and federal) 
pertaining to the amendment should lead to the conclusion that the 
amendment is in fact more consistent with a non-divestiture interpre-
tation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Public Law 83-280 (PL 280)1 was primarily intended to enable 
state criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within Indian 
country and, secondarily, to open state courthouse doors to civil ac-
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ALSC office as staff attorney or supervising attorney for eighteen years.  After 
graduating from Harvard Law School cum laude in 1980, he clerked for former 
Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay Rabinowitz and subsequently worked in 
private practice with the Law Offices of Charles E. Cole for a year, before joining 
ALSC.  He has taken two sabbaticals from ALSC to pursue his interests in physics 
at the University of Alaska Fairbanks but returned to the law thereafter at the 
unanimous behest of his science professors.  He taught for several years in the 
University of Alaska Fairbanks paralegal studies program and has made numer-
ous Bar Association Continuing Legal Education presentations on various topics. 
 1. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). 
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tions arising from within Indian country.  PL 280 has been de-
scribed as a “complicated statute which has been very controver-
sial . . . often . . . misunderstood and misapplied . . . [with a] practi-
cal impact . . . way beyond that which was legally required, 
intended, and contemplated.”2  At the root of the debate is 
whether, in conferring jurisdiction on state courts, PL 280 stripped 
tribes in Alaska of their jurisdiction. 
This divestiture interpretation of PL 280 has been rejected in 
virtually all jurisdictions.3  Though it is still occasionally raised in 
various courts and has met a friendly reception in Alaska’s state 
courts,4 the divestiture interpretation’s continuing vitality in Alaska 
is not clear. 
Supporters of the divestiture interpretation often cite Public 
Law 91-523,5 a 1970 amendment to PL 280’s criminal provision en-
acted in response to concerns raised by the Metlakatla Indian 
Community in Alaska (“Metlakatla Amendment”).6  This Article 
reviews the arguments used to link the Metlakatla Amendment to 
the divestiture interpretation by focusing on the legislative history 
of the amendment and its relation to prior amendments.  Ulti-
mately, this Article concludes that the Metlakatla Amendment nei-
ther ratified nor codified the divestiture interpretation into PL 280. 
 
 2. Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns 
for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, http://www.tribal-institute. 
org/articles/gardner1.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 3. Office of Tribal Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Concurrent Tribal Au-
thority Under Public Law 83-280 (Nov. 9, 2000), http://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/concurrent_tribal.htm (“Indian tribes retain concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction over Indians in PL 280 states. That is the shared view of the Federal 
Government and the vast majority of courts that have directly considered the is-
sue.”). 
 4. See Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Serv., 722 
P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in part by In 
re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001). 
 5. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)). 
 6. “The nearly unanimous view among tribal courts, state courts, and lower 
federal courts, state attorneys general, the Solicitor’s Office for the Department of 
the Interior, and legal scholars is that Public Law 280 left the inherent civil and 
criminal jurisdictions of Indian nations untouched . . . . The only doubts about 
Congress’s intent derive from two 1970 amendments to Public Law 280.”  
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 560–61 (2005 ed.) (citations omit-
ted). 
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II.  THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT AND THE DIVESTITURE 
INTERPRETATION OF PL 280 
A. Relevance of the Divestiture Interpretation in Alaska and 
Elsewhere 
Is any discussion of PL 280 in Alaska necessary?  Many might 
initially respond in the negative.  In 1998, the United States Su-
preme Court in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Govern-
ment7 held that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA)8 had greatly reduced the acreage which could be consid-
ered Indian country in Alaska.9  As the Alaska Supreme Court 
noted the following year in John v. Baker,10 “P.L. 280, which grants 
states jurisdiction over disputes in Indian country, has limited ap-
plication in Alaska because most Native land will not qualify for 
the definition of Indian country.”11  The opinion went on to hold 
that PL 280 was, thus, irrelevant to a tribe’s claim to inherent mem-
bership-based jurisdiction outside Indian country.12 
Yet the debate over PL 280 in Alaska continues between pro-
tribal advocates, who favor tribal jurisdiction, and anti-tribal advo-
cates, who press the divestiture interpretation.  Many who oppose 
tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska state that PL 280 abrogated tribal 
jurisdiction both within and outside of Indian country.  Most re-
cently, this view was articulated by former Alaska Attorney Gen-
eral Gregg Renkes in October of 2004 when he issued an opinion13 
taking the position that Native Village of Nenana v. State, Depart-
ment of Health & Social Services,14 even though overruled in part,15 
still stood for the proposition that PL 280 deprives Alaska Native 
Villages of any authority to initiate child protection proceedings in 
tribal court.16  The opinion states Alaska’s tribes can only exercise 
jurisdiction by (a) petitioning to resume jurisdiction under 25 
 
7. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2000). 
 9. 522 U.S. at 532. 
 10. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000). 
 11. Id. at 747–48 (Alaska 1999). 
12. Id. at 748. 
 13. Jurisdiction of State and Tribal Courts In Child Protection Matters, 2004 
Op. Att’y Gen. No. 1 (Oct. 1, 2004), A.G. file no. 661-04-0467, available at 
http://146.63.113.142/pdf/opinions/opinions/661040467.pdf [hereinafter Renkes 
Op.]. 
 14. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in 
part by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001). 
15. In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 850. 
 16. See Renkes Op., supra note 13, at 7–21. 
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U.S.C. § 1918,17 or (b) petitioning to transfer a case from state court 
under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).18  By applying the divestiture interpreta-
tion of PL 280 to Alaska Native Villages regardless of whether they 
occupy Indian country perpetuates the divestiture debate despite 
the dearth of Indian country in Alaska after ANCSA.19 
Pro-sovereignty advocates, although in strong disagreement 
with the Renkes opinion, would agree that PL 280 still has rele-
vance in Alaska because the Venetie ruling did not completely 
eliminate Indian country in Alaska.20  As long as there is some In-
dian country in Alaska, the question of whether PL 280 was a di-
vestiture statute will remain relevant.  The Metlakatla Reservation, 
the sole Alaska reservation to have survived ANCSA, is clearly In-
dian country within even the narrowest interpretation of the statu-
tory definition.21  Further, the approximately 900,000 acres of re-
stricted Alaska Native allotments22 and the approximately 3,800 
Alaska Native townsite lots23 are strong candidates for Indian coun-
try status.24  PL 280 therefore has some geographical scope in 
 
 17. Id. at 3, 19.  Tribes can petition for either exclusive jurisdiction (as Chevak 
and Barrow have done) or for concurrent jurisidiction (as Metlakatla has done).  
Id. at 19. 
 18. Id. at 3, 12–14.  The opinion mentions that tribes in non-PL 280 states have 
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children under twenty-five years of age residing 
on reservations under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) without having to petition for reas-
sumption, but since Alaska is a PL 280 state, this provision will have little or no 
application.  Id. at 10–12. 
 19. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 
(2000).  The Act revoked reserves set aside for Native use, except for the Annette 
Island Reserve inhabited by the Metlakatla Indians.  Id. at § 1618(a); accord 
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2 (1998). 
 20. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 n.2. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Alaska Native Allotment Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1 to 270-3, repealed by 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, §18(a), 85 Stat. 688, 710 
(1971).  The Act allowed pending applications to go through.  Id.  Also, Natives 
who occupied land as their primary residence at the time of the passage of the Act 
could apply for up to 160 acres of vacant, unappropriated, unreserved land.  Id. § 
13(h)(5), 85 Stat. at 705 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h)(5) (2000)). 
 23. Alaska Native Townsite Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 733–736 (repealed 1976). 
 24. Some cases have discussed, without ruling, whether Alaska Native allot-
ments are “Indian country.”  See Jones v. State, 936 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1997) (State can criminally prosecute for activities occurring on Alaska Na-
tive allotment under PL 280 regardless of whether allotment is Indian country); 
People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Alaska 
1979) (municipality cannot tax realty and fixtures on Alaska Native allotments but 
can tax personalty, regardless of whether allotments are Indian country).  South 
Naknek also addressed but did not decide if Native Townsites were Indian coun-
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Alaska, although the exact delineation of that scope may need to 
await future court decisions. 
PL 280 certainly has application within the other mandatory 
PL 280 states and within approximately ten states that have exer-
cised the option PL 280 gave them to extend their jurisdiction into 
Indian country.25  The dissent in John v. Baker opined that PL 280 
eliminated tribal jurisdiction in areas over which state jurisdiction 
was extended.26  If this view were ultimately to prevail, it would 
have a profound impact on tribal-state relations in those other 
states that have consistently recognized and upheld concurrent 
tribal jurisdiction.  The dissent was not Alaska-specific: “Congress 
therefore chose to define the remaining Indian country in Alaska 
covered by P.L. 280 and all Indian country in the other five states, 
except for the excepted reservations, as ‘areas over which the sev-
eral States have exclusive jurisdiction.’”27 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Metlakatla Amendment has 
been utilized outside Alaska to resist residual tribal jurisdiction.  
For example, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians had to argue 
about the Metlakatla Amendment in federal district court in 1998.28  
The tribe countered in part that the Amendment “was adopted to 
resolve a problem unique to Alaska as to the status of Indian coun-
try in that state.”29  The Cabazon court eventually rejected the di-
vestiture interpretation, concluding that the Band retained its in-
herent criminal jurisdiction notwithstanding PL 280.30  Still, the case 
 
try.  See id. at 877 (municipality cannot tax realty and fixtures on Alaska Native 
Townsite lots but can tax personalty, regardless of whether townsite lots are In-
dian country).  For a general discussion of allotments and townsites in Alaska, see 
D. CASE & D. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 101–53 (2d ed., 
Univ. of Alaska Press, 2002). 
 25. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 362–63, n.125 (1982 
ed.). 
 26. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 809 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 810–11 (emphasis added). 
 28. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 29. Id. at 1198 n.9. 
 30. Id. at 1200.  Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment against 
the tribe on the separate issue of whether the state could regulate the use of tribal 
emergency vehicles with emergency lights while traveling on state highways to get 
between non-adjacent areas of the reservation; the court found that California’s 
regulations had not been shown to have significantly interfered with the tribal law 
enforcement activities.  Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 
1201, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming but 
then withdrew that opinion and ordered the district court to vacate its judgment 
and consider the impact of a 2001 BIA Deputation Agreement.  Cabazon Band of 
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illustrates two points: first, that the Metlakatla Amendment has fu-
eled legal arguments against tribes outside as well as within Alaska, 
and second, that all too often the response from non-Alaskan tribes 
has been that the amendment should be regarded as “unique to 
Alaska” and, that whatever its meaning, it should not apply to “In-
dian tribes in other designated states.”31  Any attempt to distinguish 
Alaska from other PL 280 states would be erroneous; PL 280 does 
not treat Alaska differently from other listed “mandatory” states.32 
For those reasons, notwithstanding the Venetie decision and 
the marked diminution of Indian country in Alaska, it is not a com-
pletely academic exercise to address the 1970 Metlakatla Amend-
ment in historical context. 
B. Case Reliance on the Metlakatla Amendment as Support for 
the Divestiture Interpretation 
The Metlakatla Amendment had two components: 1) a change 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) to list Metlakatla as an “exception” to the 
areas of Indian country covered by the statute, and 2) the addition 
of the phrase “as areas over which the several states have exclusive 
jurisdiction” to subsection (c), which makes two federal criminal 
jurisdiction provisions inapplicable within areas of Indian country 
covered by PL 280.33 
The Metlakatla Amendment has been cited as supporting the 
divestiture interpretation in several instances.34  These arguments 
have been based on one or more of three rationales. 
 
Mission Indians v. Smith, 271 F.3d 910, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2001).  The district court 
did reconsider but again ruled against the tribe.  Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 
v. Smith, No. CV 97-4687CAS(JGX), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27472, *35 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 17, 2002).  The Ninth Circuit then overruled the district court, holding that 
the state was “precluded by the preemptive force of federal Indian law from pro-
hibiting the [t]ribe’s use and display of emergency light bars on its police vehicle 
when those vehicles were traveling on public roads in performance of the tribal 
officers’ law enforcement functions.”  Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 
388 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 31. See Cabazon Band, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 n.9. 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000).  Both sections simply 
list Alaska alongside the five other mandatory states. 
 33. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)). 
 34. Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Serv., 722 P.2d 
219, 221–22 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986), overruled in part by 
In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 850 (Alaska 2001).  The court rested its reasoning in 
part on the difficulty reconciling the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1360 left Alaska 
Native Villages with concurrent jurisdiction and the subsequent intent of Congress 
embodied in explicit legislation to enable the Metlakatla Indian Community to 
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The first rationale is that the 1970 amendment was necessary 
to give Metlakatla concurrent criminal jurisdiction because PL 280 
had removed that jurisdiction.  The Nenana court stated: “It is dif-
ficult to reconcile that [PL 280 intended that Native councils con-
tinue to exercise their jurisdiction concurrently with the state] with 
the subsequent intent of Congress embodied in legislation enacted 
in 1970 to enable the Metlakatla Indian Community to exercise 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.”35  Justice Matthews, in dissent in 
John v. Baker, similarly argued that “[t]his amendment is impor-
tant because it recognizes that the Metlakatla community lacked 
concurrent jurisdiction prior to the amendment. This, in turn, 
represents a recognition of pre-amendment exclusive jurisdiction in 
the state.”36 Finally, a California district court articulated this point 
as follows: 
Defendants also argue that the language employed by Congress 
when it amended P.L. 280 and extended it to Indian country in 
Alaska supports its plain meaning argument, in that Congress 
found it necessary to specifically confer concurrent jurisdiction 
over criminal matters to the Metlakatla Indian community, be-
cause absent such measure, the State of Alaska would have had 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction.  Defendants argue that this provi-
sion in the amendment to P.L. 280 would have been unnecessary 
if the tribe had preexisting concurrent criminal jurisdiction.37 
The second rationale is that, because the Interior Department 
subscribed to the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 as of 1970, 
that interpretation was implicitly adopted by Congress. 
Indeed, the Department of the Interior reported to Congress 
with respect to the 1970 amendment that P.L. 280, when made 
applicable to Alaska, “acted to remove, with limited exceptions, 
the civil and criminal jurisdiction for law and order purposes 
previously held by the Indian and native groups and the Federal 
Government.”  The first section of the 1970 amendment thus re-
flected Congress’s belief that P.L. 280, as applied to Alaska, 
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the state.38 
 
exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction.  See also John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 
808–12 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Matthews relied exten-
sively on the difficulty reconciling the explicit Metlakatla exception within the 
1970 amendment. 
 35. Nenana, 722 P.2d at 222 (quoting Governor’s Task Force on Federal-
State-Tribal Relations [In Alaska], 141–42 (1986) (footnotes omitted)). 
 36. Baker, 982 P.2d at 810 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting). 
 37. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 n.9 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 38. Baker, 982 P.2d at 810 (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). 
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The third rationale is that explicit inclusion of the term “exclu-
sive” in subsection (c) constitutes a definitive Congressional pro-
nouncement that state jurisdiction under PL 280 was intended to 
be exclusive of any tribal jurisdiction. The dissent in John v. Baker 
elaborated: 
Section 2 of the 1970 amendment was necessary because under 
section 1 Metlakatla remained Indian country covered by P.L. 
280.  But Congress wanted the Indian community to have con-
current jurisdiction with the state in that area. Congress there-
fore chose to define the remaining Indian country in Alaska cov-
ered by P.L. 280 and all Indian country in the other five states, 
except for the excepted reservations, as “areas over which the 
several States have exclusive jurisdiction.”  This language is 
more than merely an expression of Congress’s belief that P.L. 
280 granted exclusive jurisdiction to the states; it ratifies that be-
lief.  It cannot be dismissed as merely the opinion of a later Con-
gress concerning the meaning of a law passed by an earlier Con-
gress. The later Congress changed the original act’s language to 
both reflect and enact its belief.39 
The California district court added that the: 
defendants assert that subsection (c) of section 1162, which pro-
vides that “sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be 
applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection 
(a) of this section as areas over which the several states have ex-
clusive jurisdiction, establishes that the states shall have the sole 
authority to promulgate and enforce criminal law in those 
states.”  Defendants argue that if Congress contemplated that 
the designated states would have concurrent criminal law juris-
diction with any other sovereign, including Indian tribes, it 
would not have used the term “exclusive” in subsection (c).40 
A closer examination of the historical context and legislative 
history of that amendment, however, indicates that all three ration-
ales are inaccurate or incomplete.  First, the need for corrective 
legislation in 1970 was not based on the divestiture interpretation 
of PL 280 (in that a suitable remedy for Metlakatla for that particu-
lar aspect of the problem had already been enacted by Congress in 
1968) but on the need to overturn a 1958 court pronouncement de-
claring that the Reserve was not Indian country.41  Second, al-
though the June 2, 1970 letter from the Department of the Interior, 
written in connection with the House Bill, does reflect adherence 
to the “divestiture” interpretation,42 subsequent correspondence 
 
 39. Id. at 810–11 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 40. Cabazon Band, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 
 41. United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269, 275 (D. Alaska 1958). 
 42. Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. 
James O. Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 2, 
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from the Interior on November 10, 1970, written in connection with 
the Senate Bill which ultimately became law, reflects the opposite.43  
Finally, the term “exclusive” in subsection (c) was intended by 
Congress to mean exclusive of federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1152 and 1153 and, if interpreted to mean exclusive of tribal ju-
risdiction, leads to a logical conundrum centered in Metlakatla it-
self. 
III.  INDIAN COUNTRY, RESIDUAL JURISDICTION, AND THE 
DIVESTITURE INTERPRETATION 
A. Indian Country and the Federal Policy Underlying Conferral 
of Jurisdiction to State Courts in PL 280 
Generally, absent congressional authorization, a state cannot 
enforce its criminal laws against the criminal activity of Indians in 
Indian country located within the state’s territory.44  Until 1953, the 
congressional response to perceived lawlessness within Indian 
country had been enactment of statutes creating federal jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes in federal court.  Two such provisions, the 
General Crimes Act45 and the Major Crimes Act,46 are still codified 
 
1970), included with H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 
4787–88. 
 43. Letter from Harrison Loesch, Ass’t Secretary of the Interior, to Hon. 
Emanuel Celler, Chair, House Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 10, 1970), 116 CONG. REC. 
37355 (1970) [hereinafter Loesch Letter]. 
 44. See generally Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 
U.S. 351, 359 (1962). 
 45. Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1152 (2000)).  The General Crimes Act has also been referred to as the “Indian 
Country Crimes Act” or the “Inter-Racial Crimes Act” or the “Federal Enclave 
Act.”  The Act descended from the earliest treaties and provisions of the Indian 
Trade and Intercourse Acts from 1790 forward.  The present provision was origi-
nally enacted in 1834, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000)). In its current incarnation, it provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing 
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law 
of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive ju-
risdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes re-
spectively. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 758 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1153 (2000)). The Major Crimes Act was enacted in response to the decision in Ex 
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in the United States Code; in fact, they are the “§§ 1152 and 1153” 
of Title 18 referenced in the crucial subsection (c) of the criminal 
portion of PL 280,47 and as such they do play a role in the interpre-
tation of the 1970 amendment. 
By contrast, in 1953, Congress, again faced with a problem of 
lawlessness on certain reservations, took a different approach.  
Rather than expanding federal criminal jurisdiction further, Con-
gress, in an early version of an unfunded mandate, called upon the 
states to extend the reach of their criminal laws into the Indian 
country within their borders.  Congress made this criminal law ju-
risdictional extension mandatory for five states; other states were 
given the option of extending their jurisdiction.48  This was PL 280 
in a nutshell.  It eliminated the barriers to state court jurisdiction—
both criminal and civil—which the boundaries of Indian country 
otherwise presented.49 
 
Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883), which held that 
neither the federal nor the territorial courts could try an Indian for on-reservation 
murder of another Indian.  See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973).  
The Act created federal jurisdiction to try certain listed major crimes against In-
dian defendants accused of criminal conduct against Indians.  In its current incar-
nation, the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000),  reads: 
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of an-
other Indian or other person any of the following offenses, 
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony 
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit mur-
der, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in seri-
ous bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an as-
sault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 
years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 
of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the 
same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of 
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is 
not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and 
punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such 
offense was committed as are in force at the time of such of-
fense. 
 47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000). 
 48. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). The 
five mandatory states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin. Alaska was added as a mandatory state by a 1958 amendment. Act of Aug. 
8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 
(2000)). 
 49. PL 280 did not extend state “regulatory” jurisdiction into Indian country.  
See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). 
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Section 2 of the Act set out the “criminal half”50 and section 4 
set out the “civil half.”51  Section 7, uncodified, was the “optional” 
provision, giving the consent of the United States to any other state 
to assume jurisdiction over the Indian country within that state’s 
borders.52  This Article focuses on the criminal provision, as that 
was the subject of the Metlakatla Amendment. 
As enacted, the new criminal provision read: 
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have ju-
risdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the 
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to 
the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses 
committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of 
such State shall have the same force and effect within such In-
dian country as they have elsewhere within the State: 
 
State of Indian country affected   
California. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State.   
Minnesota. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except 
the Red Lake Reservation.   
Nebraska. . . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State.   
Oregon. . . . . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except 
the Warm Springs Reservation.   
Wisconsin. . . . . . . . .All Indian country within the State, except 
the Menominee Reservation. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including 
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, 
or community that is held in trust by the United States or is sub-
ject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United 
States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property 
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or 
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall 
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of 
any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, 
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fish-
ing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof. 
 
 50. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000)). 
 51. Id. at § 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). 
 52. Id. at § 7.  Section 1 put the new chapter heading into the chapter analysis 
for the criminal provision; section 2 contained the text of the new section.  Sec-
tions 3 and 4 did the same for the civil section.  Section 5 repealed a prior nar-
rower 1949 enactment which had given California jurisdiction over the Agua Cali-
ente Indian Reservation.  Section 6 gave the consent of the United States to any 
state to amend where necessary their constitution to remove any legal impediment 
to assumption of jurisdiction. 
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(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall 
not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in 
subsection (a) of this section.53 
One comment with respect to subsections (a) and (c) is perti-
nent here.  Subsection (c) refers to the “areas of Indian country 
listed in subsection (a),” but this reference is not without ambigu-
ity, since the tabular structure of subsection (a) in fact contained 
two lists of Indian country: one in which criminal jurisdiction was 
not being given to the states (the Menominee, Red Lake, and 
Warm Springs Reservations), and the other in which criminal juris-
diction was being given to the states (all remaining Indian country 
in Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin, and all Indian country in 
California and Nebraska).  The ambiguity did not present a par-
ticularly difficult conundrum, since the intent of subsection (c) was 
clear: Congress did not want the theretofore applicable federal 
criminal jurisdictional statutes—the General Crimes Act and the 
Major Crimes Act—to apply any longer in those areas of Indian 
country where the states would now be able to prosecute wrongdo-
ers.  These federal criminal jurisdictional statutes would logically 
continue to apply within the Menominee, Red Lake, and Warm 
Springs Reservations, within which the corresponding states had no 
criminal jurisdiction under PL 280.54 
B. Background to the 1958 Addition of Alaska as a PL 280 Juris-
diction 
The Territory of Alaska was not included in the original 1953 
listing of mandatory PL 280 states.  It was not added until 1958 be-
cause the issue of the extent to which Alaska contained “Indian 
country,” which had flared up shortly after the acquisition of 
Alaska by the United States, simmered down and did not arise 
 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000). 
 54. The Menominee Reservation was stricken from the list in 1954, effectively 
moving that Reservation from the “uncovered” list to the “covered” list.  Act of 
Aug. 24, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-661, 68 Stat. 795 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1360 (2000)).  This was a follow-up to the Act of June 17, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, 
68 Stat. 250, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to terminate federal 
supervision over the Menominee Tribe’s property and members.  The termination 
was not completed by the Secretary until 1961, so Wisconsin had PL 280 jurisdic-
tion from 1954 to 1961.  Following passage of the Menominee Restoration Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903–903f (2000)), 
Wisconsin and the federal government disputed whether Wisconsin still had PL 
280 jurisdiction; the issue was resolved when Wisconsin, utilizing the 1968 
amendments to PL 280, discussed infra, retroceded its PL 280 jurisdiction. See 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 362 n.122 (1982 ed.). 
01__HARRINGTON.DOC 6/5/2006  3:59 PM 
2006] METLAKATLA AMENDMENT 13 
again until 1957.  The earliest cases did not consider whether there 
might be enclaves of Indian country within Alaska but instead 
treated all of Alaska as one unitary area, deciding whether Alaska 
as a whole was Indian country or not.  The eventual answer was 
that Alaska was Indian country for some, but not all, purposes. 
The definition of Indian country that was on the books when 
Alaska was acquired in 1867 was the one enshrined in the last 
Trade and Intercourse Act, from 1837: 
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, 
and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the terri-
tory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of 
the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the In-
dian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, 
be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.55 
Despite the text clearly encompassing Alaska,56 in 1872 the Federal 
District Court for the District of Oregon held that Alaska was not 
“Indian country.”57  Congress responded four months later by mak-
ing Alaska Indian country for the purposes of sections 20 and 21 of 
the Trade and Intercourse Act.58  The court in 1875 held that this 
enactment made Alaska Indian country for purposes of section 23 
of the Act as well,59 but it subsequently held that Alaska was not 
Indian country for purposes of other provisions of the Act.60  Thus, 
when the 1834 definition disappeared from the United States Code 
as part of the 1874 Revision of Statutes,61 the answer to the ques-
 
 55. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, 4 Stat. 729. 
 56. Interpreting this definition, and perhaps reflecting some exasperation at 
the inexplicable ruling of the Supreme Court of Oregon in United States v. Tom, 1 
Or. 26, 27–28 (Or. 1853) (holding that Oregon was not included in this definition), 
Attorney General Caleb Cushing wrote: “Why, I repeat, does not this description 
apply to Oregon with mathematical precision of certainty? Is not Oregon a ‘part 
of the United States, west of the Mississippi’?” Indians in Oregon, 7 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 293, 296 (1855). 
 57. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872).  As to why 
the Seveloff ruling chose to eschew Attorney General Cushing’s analysis and fol-
low the 1853 Tom ruling, see generally D. Niedermeyer, The True Interests of a 
White Population: The Alaska Indian Country Decisions of Judge Matthew P. 
Deady, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 195 (1988). 
 58. Act of Mar. 8, 1873, 17 Stat. 530. 
 59. In re Carr, 1 Alaska Fed. 75, 77 (D. Or. 1875). 
 60. Waters v. Campbell, 29 F. Cas. 411, 411–12 (C.C.D. Or. 1876) (No. 
17,264). 
 61. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 31 (1982 ed.). 
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tion of whether Alaska was Indian country was “yes” for some 
purposes but “no” for others.62 
After 1874, Alaska’s status as Indian country vel non became 
less unitary as various reservations were established, starting with 
the Metlakatla Reservation itself, created by statute in 1891.63  Nu-
merous reservations of varying sizes were created as reindeer re-
serves (starting in 1901), executive order reserves (starting in 1905), 
public purpose reserves (starting in 1920), and Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act reserves (starting in 1936).64 
Following the 1874 disappearance of the prior definition of In-
dian country, a new statutory definition was not forthcoming from 
Congress until 1948, by which time the concept of Indian country 
had changed through judicial interpretation from a general notion 
of lands beyond a frontier to a more enclave-oriented description 
of lands within specific boundaries in the states and territories.65  In 
1948, Congress encapsulated these court rulings into a new tripar-
tite codification: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this ti-
tle, the term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a) 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the ju-
risdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
 
 62. Despite the elimination of the statutory definition from the revision, other 
provisions in the Code referring to Indian country necessitated that some defini-
tion be utilized.  The United States Supreme Court held that resorting to the for-
mer 1834 definition was still appropriate and further held that this definition was 
to be applied to “all the country to which the Indian title has not been extin-
guished within the limits of the United States, even when not within a reservation 
expressly set apart for the exclusive occupancy of Indians, although much of it has 
been acquired since the passage of the act of 1834.”  Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca 
(Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883).  Despite the reference to “acquired since 
the passage,” the Alaska courts continued to hold that Alaska was only Indian 
country for the specific purposes enumerated by Congress.  See, e.g., Kie v. United 
States, 27 F. 351, 353 (C.C.D. Or. 1886).  As of 1885, these purposes included “sec-
tion 1955 of the act of July [27], 1868, and sections 20 and 21 of the intercourse act 
of 1834, and section 14 of the act of May [17], 1884.”  United States v. Nelson, 29 
F. 202, 203 (D. Alaska 1886), aff’d, 30 F. 112 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).  Nelson held that 
section 14 of the 1884 Act had superseded sections 20 and 21 of the 1834 Act 
within Alaska, and this apparently defused the issue of for which purposes Alaska 
was or was not “Indian country.”  Id. 
 63. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 15, 26 Stat. 1095, 1101 (1891) (formerly codi-
fied at 48 U.S.C. § 358). 
 64. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND 
AMERICAN LAWS 65–95 (2d ed. 2002). 
 65. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 29–33 (1982 ed.). 
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within the borders of the United States whether within the origi-
nal or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether 
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the same.66 
The first case to apply this statutory definition in Alaska was de-
cided in 1957 and concluded that the Territory of Alaska could not 
prosecute a Native Alaskan for actions committed within the Tyo-
nek Reservation because the reservation met the definition of In-
dian country and because Congress had not included Alaska within 
the 1953 enactment of PL 280.67  In 1958, Congress responded to 
this ruling by extending PL 280 to Alaska, adding the “Territory of 
Alaska” to the list of the original five mandatory PL 280 states.68 
C. Early History of the Divestiture Interpretation 
The current well-established consensus is that PL 280 did not 
curtail tribal jurisdiction.  However, for the first several years fol-
lowing enactment of the statute, the issue was apparently not liti-
gated at all, or was litigated only minimally, and reported cases 
contain little or no discussion of the subject. 
Shortly after PL 280’s enactment, a brief letter within the Inte-
rior Department indicated that PL 280 had eliminated tribal juris-
diction.69  That conclusion was uncritically repeated in a 1954 Solici-
 
 66. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (1948) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)). 
 67. In re McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132, 134–35 (D. Alaska 1957). 
 68. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545.  Although Alaska at-
tained statehood shortly afterwards, PL 280 still gave its authority to the “Terri-
tory” of Alaska in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 until 1970, and in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 until 1984.  
See Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title I, § 110, 98 Stat. 342 (1984). 
 69. “Although there has been no interpretation of the act of Aug. 15, 1953 
(Public Law 280-83d Cong.), by the Federal courts, it is our view that the act, by 
providing that the State shall have jurisdiction over crimes and offenses commit-
ted by or against Indians in the Indian country to the same extent that the State 
has jurisdiction over crimes and offenses committed elsewhere within the State, 
except as limited in Section 2(b), made such jurisdiction of the State exclusive.  
The extent of the State’s jurisdiction is full and complete and permits of no such 
jurisdiction by any other body save the Federal Government and subordinate 
agencies of the state itself.  The act also explicitly states that the criminal laws 
shall have the same force and effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere 
within the State.  The effect of this provision clearly is to extend both the substan-
tive and procedural laws of the State to crimes committed by Indians.  Thus, State 
law defines not only the criminal offenses against the State and the penalties 
therefore, but it also defines the courts in which and the manner in which persons 
accused of committing such affenses [sic] are to be tried.”  Solic. Mem. Op., 6 
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tor’s Opinion70 and in a Memorandum in 1961.71  All three were 
overruled by a subsequent Solicitor’s Opinion issued in 1978.72  The 
opinion observed of the prior “divestiture” interpretation, “the po-
sition seems never to have been the subject of any considered legal 
analysis and now appears to be in conflict with principles enunci-
ated in recent decisions of the Supreme Court.”73  This 1978 Opin-
ion did not represent an abrupt change; prior to 1978, the Interior 
Department had issued statements recognizing residual tribal juris-
diction as early as 197674 and had taken actions that implicitly rec-
 
INDIAN L. REP. H-1, H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978) (quoting Letter from Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior Lewis to Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Minneapolis, 
Minn. (June 4, 1954)). 
 70. “It has been concluded that the effect of section 1162 is, among other mat-
ters, to repeal whatever power the tribes within that State may otherwise have 
possessed to impose their own criminal laws respecting any matter which section 
1162 makes subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State.”  Solic. Mem. Op. M-
36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), II Op. of the Solic. of the Dep’t of the Interior Relating to 
Indian Affairs 1917–1974 1649, 1650 (1979), available at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1626-1650.html#m-36241 [hereinafter 1954 
Opinion].  This September 1954 opinion focuses more on a separate Act passed 
simultaneously with PL 280: “An Act to eliminate certain discriminatory legisla-
tion against Indians in the United States.”  Pub. L. No. 83-277, 67 Stat. 586 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2000)).  That Act made the federal Indian liquor laws in-
applicable to any act outside Indian country or to any transaction within Indian 
country conducted in conformity both with the laws of the State and the tribe.  
The Opinion notes that tribes, including tribes within California (a mandatory PL 
280 state) have the residual authority to enact alcohol ordinances.  It explains that 
“the scope of such a tribal ordinance is to be as much within the discretion of the 
tribe as the scope of the State liquor laws is to be within the discretion of the 
State” but notes that the reasoning of the June 4, 1954, letter means that “while, as 
noted above, an Indian tribe in California may by ordinance impose conditions 
consistent with the laws of that State upon the sale of liquor within its reservation, 
the penalty for violation of such conditions is to be imposed by the United States 
pursuant to sections 1154, 1156, and 3618 of Title 18, U.S.C., rather than by any 
provision of tribal law.”  1954 Opinion, supra, at 1649–50. 
 71. Solic. Mem. Op. (Feb. 13, 1961), II Op. of the Solic. of the Dep’t of the In-
terior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917–1974 1896 (1979), available at 
http://thorpe.ou.edu/sol_opinions/p1876-1900.htm. 
 72. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36907, 6 INDIAN L. REP. H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978). 
 73. Id. at H-2. 
 74. “[T]his office ha[d] already expressed the view that Pub. L. 280 did not di-
vest Indian tribes of their part of the previously-existing concurrent Federal-tribal 
jurisdiction but transferred only Federal jurisdiction to the States.” Id. at H-1 (re-
ferring to Solic. Mem. Op. (July 13, 1976)). 
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ognized residual tribal jurisdiction as far back as 1973.75  In fact,  
portions of the Interior Department correspondence with respect 
to the Metlakatla Amendment indicate that the Interior had 
started to move away from its prior divestiture position as early as 
1970. 
Since 1978, the other “so-called mandatory Public Law 280 
states that have addressed the issue consider state and tribal juris-
diction to be concurrent under Public Law 280.”76  Examples 
abound, with authorities either explicitly holding that PL 280 left 
states and tribes with concurrent jurisdiction,77 or deciding cases 
with that implicit assumption.78  Cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1360 
from two mandatory PL 280 states (California and Minnesota) 
have reached the Supreme Court.  The resulting rulings have indi-
cated that the tribes do have residual authority under PL 280.79  
 
 75. The Department had certified as far back as 1973 that several tribes in PL 
280 states were performing law and order functions for purposes of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197.  See id. (referring to 38 
Fed. Reg. 13,758–59). 
 76. State v. Schmuck, 850 P.2d 1332, 1344 (Wash. 1993). 
 77. Lemke v. Brooks, 614 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Teague v. 
Bad River Band, 612 N.W.2d 709, 716–17 (Wis. 2000); see Walker v. Rushing, 898 
F.2d 672, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1990); 70 Op. Wis. Att’y Gen. 237, 1981 WL 157271 
(1981); Op. Letter from Robert M. Spire, Att’y Gen., and Charles E. Lowe, Assis-
tant Att’y Gen., to Sen. James E. Goll, Neb. Leg., Op. No. 48 (Mar. 28, 1985), re-
printed in 1985 WL 168524 at *2; see also Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 
F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[N]either the Indian Child Welfare Act nor Public 
Law 280 prevents [Alaska Native Villages] from exercising concurrent jurisdic-
tion.”). 
 78. See generally Donahue v. Justice Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971); Zachary v. Wilk, 219 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Oregon v. Sur-
face, 802 P.2d 100 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). 
 79. In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), the Supreme Court held 
that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1360 was to grant states jurisdiction over private 
civil litigation involving Indians in state court but not to extend state regulatory 
authority into Indian country, and thus the statute did not grant states the power 
to tax personal property within Indian country.  Similarly, in California v. Caba-
zon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), the Supreme Court held that 
PL 280 did not authorize enforcement of state laws regulating bingo and card 
games, since these were regulatory rather than criminal laws.  In both cases, it was 
clear that the tribes had authority.  The Cabazon opinion explicitly mentions that 
the bingo games were conducted pursuant to tribal ordinances.  480 U.S. at 204–
05, 207 n.2.  In Bryan, although there is no explicit mention that the tribe itself was 
imposing a tax, the Court indicated that the tribe could do so, noting a concern 
that “general regulatory control [in the states] might relegate tribal governments 
to a level below that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially destroying 
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The only discordant note among these otherwise harmonious rul-
ings came from the Alaska Supreme Court in the Nenana line of 
cases,80 now overruled in part. 
However, these developments in the case law all post-date the 
1970 Metlakatla Amendment.  The conventional wisdom is that, as 
of June 1970, the Interior Department was still adhering to its for-
mer view that PL 280 had eliminated tribal jurisdiction (although, 
as mentioned above, the legislative history of the 1970 Metlakatla 
Amendment contains indications that the Department of the Inte-
rior was beginning to move away from its prior interpretation as 
more fully developed infra).81 
The question thus becomes whether the 1970 amendment, 
passed against the backdrop of the now-repudiated Interior De-
partment interpretation, had the effect of concretizing that divesti-
ture interpretation into the statute itself.  The answer should be 
“no” for reasons elaborated infra. 
D. History of the Divestiture Interpretation in Pre-ICWA Alaska 
The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted or cited PL 280 in 
several cases, but the net result has been that the divestiture inter-
pretation, although not clearly repudiated, has also not been un-
equivocally adopted.  Its earliest pronouncements in the 1970s lean 
towards a non-divestiture reading of the statute.  The mid-1980s 
ushered in several rulings suggesting a divestiture interpretation, 
and the overruling of those cases in 2001, while still avoiding a de-
finitive interpretation of PL 280, leaves the question open in 
Alaska.  The fact that the divestiture interpretation is still possible, 
despite having been rejected in virtually all other jurisdictions fac-
ing the issue, indicates that the divestiture interpretation has had a 
considerably warmer welcome in Alaska than elsewhere. 
The first four PL 280 cases decided by the Alaska Supreme 
Court82 all came in 1977, and two of them seemed to herald a non-
 
them, particularly if they might raise revenue only after the tax base had been fil-
tered through many governmental layers of taxation.”  426 U.S. at 388 n.14. 
 80. See discussion infra Part III.E. 
 81. The Department of the Interior had previously taken the position, ex-
pressed as late as 1970, that PL 280 vested exclusive criminal jurisdiction in the 
States.  See, e.g., Letter of the Dep’t of Interior on the Metlakatla Amendment, in 
H. R. REP. NO. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784. 
 82. The Alaska Supreme Court resolved Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 362 
P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961) (upholding the state law fish trap ban over the authority of 
the Secretary of the Interior to allow fish traps for Native communities), without 
reference to PL 280, although the United States Supreme Court cited PL 280 both 
in upholding the ruling as to Kake and Angoon, see Organized Vill. of Kake v. 
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divestiture interpretation.  The first was Ollestead v. Native Village 
of Tyonek,83 in which individual tribal members sought a declara-
tory judgment giving them rights over the area encompassing the 
town of Tyonek and shares in the proceeds from certain oil and gas 
leases.84  The Ninth Circuit, in Fondahn v. Native Village of Tyonek, 
85 had previously ruled that there was no federal court remedy for 
the dispute.86  The superior court in Ollestead had relied on Fon-
dahn in ruling that state courts also had no jurisdiction, and that 
authority to decide such disputes lay solely with the tribe itself.87  
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, though 
laying out a different jurisdictional assessment.88  Noting that state 
court jurisdiction would arise, if it existed, under PL 280, the court 
indicated that 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (the civil half of PL 280) proba-
bly would allow Alaska state courts to adjudicate tribal member-
ship disputes in situations where (as in Tyonek) there was no tribal 
court.89  However, it refrained from making a definitive ruling on 
section 1360(a) because it found the particular dispute in this case 
to fall within the prohibition on state jurisdiction under section 
 
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962), and in reversing the ruling as to Metlakatla, see 369 
U.S. 45, 56 (1962). 
 83. 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977). 
 84. Id. at 33. 
 85. 450 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 86. Id. at 522. 
 87. See Ollestead, 560 P.2d at 32. 
 88. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit itself had ques-
tioned the continued validity of its Fondahn ruling: “It is true that [Fondahn] was 
decided in 1971, more than three years after the enactment of the Indian Bill of 
Rights on April 11, 1968.  But it is also true that the statute was not brought to our 
attention, and we did not even purport to decide what its effect upon jurisdiction 
might be.  Instead, we followed pre 1968 law, adopting and applying the reasoning 
of the Tenth Circuit in Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe . . . . The Tenth Circuit has 
indicated that Martinez may no longer be good law.”  Id. at 34 (citations omitted). 
Ultimately, federal court jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes was 
found to be lacking, in that only habeas corpus relief would be available in federal 
courts.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). 
 89. “The exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over Indian matters in Alaska was 
eliminated by a 1958 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) which gave Alaska juris-
diction over ‘civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties’ 
which arise in areas of Indian country within the then Territory.  This provision 
suggests that state courts are vested with authority to decide corporate member-
ship disputes among Indians including those involving claims under the Indian Bill 
of Rights.”  Ollestead, 560 P.2d at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
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1360(b).90  In a footnote to its analysis of section 1360(a), the court 
noted: 
The Supreme Court in Bryan, supra, indicated that “nothing in 
(the) legislative history (of 28 U.S.C. § 1360) remotely suggests 
that Congress meant the Act’s extension of civil jurisdiction to 
the States should result in the undermining or destruction of 
such tribal governments as did exist. . . .”  In this case, appellants 
admit that the Native villages of Alaska, including Tyonek, do 
not have a system of laws or tribal courts.  Therefore, state as-
sumption of jurisdiction to hear membership disputes would not 
interfere with any internal tribal or village affairs.91 
The implication seemed to be that Tyonek could establish a tribal 
court, and that if it did so, then state court adjudication of member-
ship disputes would interfere with tribal affairs and section 1360(a) 
would likely not support state assumption of jurisdiction.  The en-
tire discussion was dicta because the court concluded that, regard-
less of whether section 1360(a) allowed state jurisdiction over tribal 
membership questions, section 1360(b) precluded state jurisdiction 
in Tyonek’s case.92  Nonetheless, the fact that the court apparently 
contemplated village jurisdiction in the context of the PL 280 
analysis was significant. 
The second and third rulings later in 1977 made it clear that is-
sues regarding stock under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (“ANSCA”)93 would not be outside the scope of state jurisdic-
tion.  The supreme court first held that state courts did have juris-
diction to put ANCSA corporate stock into the hands of a state 
court trustee so that dividends could be used to pay child support 
obligations.94  The court then held that state courts could decide the 
intestate succession of ANCSA stock.95  Neither opinion expressed 
 
 90. “Since, however, we have concluded that § 1360(b) would preclude the 
assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to § 1360(a) even if it were applicable, we de-
cline to resolve the question of the extent of the jurisdictional grant found in § 
1360(a).”  Id. 
 91. Id. at 34 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 92. Id. at 34. 
93. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–1629(h). (2000)). 
 94. Calista Corp. v. DeYoung, 562 P.2d 338, 343–44 (Alaska 1977). 
 95. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 57–58 (Alaska 1977).  The two rulings 
are not entirely consistent in their reasoning.  DeYoung indicated that ANCSA 
stock was not § 1360(b) property.  562 P.2d at 341.  Mann indicated that ANCSA 
stock was 1360(b) property, since it was subject to a restriction against alienation 
imposed by the United States, but that this only limited the court’s section 1360(a) 
jurisdiction and did not affect an independent grant of state court jurisdiction un-
der ANCSA itself.  564 P.2d at 58. 
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any view on residual tribal jurisdiction or the divestiture interpreta-
tion; however, the intestate succession ruling did recognize tradi-
tional cultural adoptions under the customs and traditions of 
Alaska Native villages and allowed state courts to give recognition 
to such arrangements under the doctrine of “equitable adoption,” 
thus indicating the continued vitality of Native laws. 
Still later in 1977, the court decided Atkinson v. Haldane,96 rul-
ing that the Metlakatla Indian Community had sovereign immunity 
from tort liability in state court.97  Among the several anti-
immunity arguments rejected by the court was an argument that 
section 1360, by extending state court jurisdiction within Indian 
country, had abrogated tribal sovereign immunity.98  Fitting PL 280 
into historical context, noting that several commentators had ar-
gued against PL 280 being regarded as full “termination” legisla-
tion, and again looking to Bryan for guidance, the court decided 
that Congress had not explicitly abrogated sovereign immunity by 
enacting PL 280, and that the courts were not free to read that con-
sequence into the law.99 
Thus, as of the end of 1977, it seemed clear that PL 280 had 
not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, nor had it eliminated Na-
tive customs and traditions or the duty of state courts to give legal 
cognizance to them.  Similarly, the prospect that Alaska Native Vil-
lages might set up their own courts to resolve questions (such as 
tribal membership issues) was apparently seen by the Alaska Su-
preme Court as consistent with PL 280, indicating that tribal juris-
diction had not been completely removed. 
E. Residual Tribal Jurisdiction under PL 280 in post-ICWA 
Alaska 
Passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act100 in 1978 ushered in a 
change in Alaska case law away from issues of protection of tribal 
finances as in Ollestead and Atkinson and towards protection of 
tribal children. 
The non-divestiture view initially seemed to retain its ascen-
dancy in the child protection context in 1986 when the Alaska Su-
preme Court in In re J.M.101 remanded a case involving an Alaska 
 
 96. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). 
 97. Id. at 175. 
 98. Id. at 163–67. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–
1963 (2000)). 
 101. 718 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1986). 
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Native Child for further proceedings in the Kaltag Tribal Court.102  
The child protection case had been initiated in tribal court when 
the child’s mother failed to pick up her two-month-old child, J.M., 
following the child’s two-week hospital stay in Fairbanks.103  The 
Kaltag Village Council learned of the situation and issued a written 
order assuming custody of J.M.104  At the Council’s direction, J.M. 
was released from the hospital and placed in a foster home in Ga-
lena.105  A few weeks later, the Kaltag Village Chief contacted a 
state social worker to request state foster care payments for the 
child.106  The social worker responded that foster care payments 
would only be provided if the child were in state foster care, and 
the chief told the social worker to do what was necessary to estab-
lish the child’s right to the payments.107  The Chief later sent a letter 
specifying that the child should “remain in the custody of the 
State.”108  The social worker initiated a state court child protection 
case, in which Kaltag intervened.109  When the state court case 
moved in the direction of termination of parental rights, Kaltag ob-
jected and claimed exclusive jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 
1911(a).110  The state trial court ruled against Kaltag’s motion to 
dismiss, finding that Kaltag had relinquished custody of J.M. to the 
State of Alaska and was estopped from claiming otherwise.111  The 
state court then terminated the mother’s rights, and the tribe, as 
well as the mother, appealed.112  The Department of Health and 
Social Services, resisting the re-transfer back to tribal court, did not 
dispute that J.M. was a ward of a tribal court or that Kaltag had ex-
 
 102. Id. at 156. 
 103. Id. at 151. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 151–52. 
 110. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) reads: 
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any 
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is 
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such juris-
diction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an 
Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclu-
sive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child. 
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000).  Kaltag relied on the second sentence of this provision 
for its exclusive jurisdiction argument, as the child had been made a ward of the 
tribal court prior to state court action. J.M., 718 P.2d at 152. 
 111. J.M., 718 P.2d at 152. 
 112. Id. 
01__HARRINGTON.DOC 6/5/2006  3:59 PM 
2006] METLAKATLA AMENDMENT 23 
clusive jurisdiction under section 1911(a), but argued that Kaltag 
had waived its jurisdiction by releasing custody of J.M. to the 
State.113  The court noted, “Although we are not asked to decide 
whether Kaltag is an ‘Indian tribe’ or whether the Village Council 
is a ‘tribal court’ within the meaning of the ICWA, we will describe 
the legal bases on which Kaltag relies to justify these conclusions,” 
and proceeded to do so.114  Ultimately ruling that the Chief’s ac-
tions had not been a sufficiently explicit waiver to divest the tribe 
of jurisdiction, the court remanded the case for further proceedings 
in the Kaltag Tribal Court.115 
A few weeks later, however, the Alaska Supreme Court issued 
an opinion which came the closest that court has come to adopting 
the divestiture interpretation.  Native Village of Nenana v. State 
Department of Health and Social Services116 involved a child protec-
tion case that started in state court rather than tribal court, and the 
state court denied the motion of the Village to have the case trans-
ferred to the tribe under ICWA section 1911(b).117  The Alaska Su-
preme Court upheld this, reading ICWA section 1918(a)118 as re-
quiring the Village to obtain approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior for a petition for re-assumption of jurisdiction before it 
could require transfer of the case under section 1911(b).119  The 
court noted: 
 
 113. Id. at 153. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 154–55. 
 116. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986). 
 117. Id. at 220.  25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) reads: 
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or 
residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, 
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such pro-
ceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either 
parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or 
the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject 
to declination by the tribal court of such tribe. 
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)(2000). 
 118. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) reads: 
Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as 
amended by title IV of the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or 
pursuant to any other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over 
child custody proceedings.  Before any Indian tribe may reassume 
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, such tribe shall 
present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume such ju-
risdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (2000). 
 119. Native Vill. of Nenana, 722 P.2d at 221. 
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Our reading of 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a), indicates that Congress in-
tended that Public Law 280 give certain states, including Alaska, 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the custody of In-
dian children, and that those states exercise such jurisdiction un-
til a particular tribe petitions to reassume jurisdiction over such 
matters, and the Secretary of the Interior approves tribe’s [sic] 
petition. 
Although some commentators have concluded that Public Law 
280 does not create exclusive state jurisdiction . . . we see no ex-
planation for the mention of Public Law 280 in section 1918(a) 
unless it required reassumption.120 
Nenana was a definitive interpretation of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911 and 
1918 but not necessarily a definitive interpretation of PL 280.  The 
opinion goes on to say: 
Regardless of whether Public Law 280 vests exclusive or concur-
rent jurisdiction in the applicable states, prior to the Child Wel-
fare Act, Indian tribes may not have had jurisdiction over cus-
tody proceedings in a section 1911(b) situation, i.e., where the 
child was domiciled off the reservation . . . . The referral jurisdic-
tion provision may actually grant Indian tribes greater authority 
than they had prior to the Act.121 
Thus, the court had two alternate routes to the same conclusion: 
one interpreted ICWA and PL 280, the other interpreted ICWA 
without PL 280.  The court concluded that a section 1911(b) trans-
fer required a section 1918 petition and could be reached 
“[r]egardless of whether Public Law 280 vests exclusive or concur-
rent jurisdiction in the applicable states.”122  As a result, it is not ac-
curate to state that Nenana “held” that PL 280 had vested exclusive 
jurisdiction in the state courts.123 
 
 120. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 121. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. The court may have thought at the time that ICWA mandatory transfer 
jurisdiction might be greater than general inherent tribal jurisdiction because gen-
eral inherent jurisdiction could not encompass off-reservation children whereas 
ICWA mandatory transfer jurisdiction could, but this view was not rejected until 
thirteen years later in John v. Baker.  See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 
1999) (tribes have inherent jurisdiction over domestic relations of tribal members, 
including child custody, regardless of whether they occupy Indian country).  Al-
ternatively, the court may have thought that the authority to mandate a transfer of 
an already-existing state court case was a greater authority than tribal courts 
would have under a general state/tribal concurrent jurisdiction pattern under 
which the first case filed in time would generally be allowed to be completed 
without interference from the other jurisdiction.  This latter view was noted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska.  944 F.2d 548, 
561 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Likewise, referral jurisdiction is broader in scope than con-
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The court twice in subsequent years declined to overrule Ne-
nana, first in 1987 in In re K.E.,124 in which the court adhered to 
Nenana with minimal discussion,125 and again in 1992 in In re F.P.,126 
in which there was substantial discussion of the intervening 1991 
Ninth Circuit decision in the Venetie adoption case.127  The Ninth 
Circuit had ruled that, were the Native Villages of Fort Yukon and 
Venetie found to be the modern-day successors to historical vil-
lages, then they would have authority to grant tribal adoptions, ef-
fectively rejecting the divestiture view of PL 280.128  But the Alaska 
Supreme Court in F.P. was not persuaded that the Venetie adop-
tion holding required it to overrule Nenana.  In F.P.,129 the court 
noted that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that Venetie and Fort 
Yukon might be sovereign if they were the modern-day successors 
to historical tribes was inconsistent with a 1988 Alaska Supreme 
Court ruling in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & 
Planning.130 In Stevens, the court had undertaken a survey of fed-
eral tribal relations in Alaska and concluded that, with the sole ex-
ception of Metlakatla, there were no federally recognized tribes in 
Alaska.131 
F.P. represented the nadir of judicial rulings on state/tribal au-
thority; the court indicated that PL 280 had removed tribal author-
ity and that there had never been any tribes in Alaska from which 
such authority could be removed.132  This makes it even less appo-
 
current jurisdiction, in that referral jurisdiction is concurrent but presumptively 
tribal jurisdiction.”). 
 124. 744 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1987). 
 125. Id. at 1174. 
 126. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992). 
 127. Id. at 1215–16. 
 128. See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council, 944 F.2d at 558–59.  The sup-
posed conflict between the Venetie and Nenana rulings was not as great as it ap-
peared.  If one read Nenana as having relied primarily on its construction of sec-
tions 1918 and 1911(b) and read Venetie as having ruled that PL 280 did not 
abrogate concurrent tribal jurisdiction, while acknowledging the possibility that a 
petition to re-assume under section 1918 might be required for either section 
1911(a) exclusive jurisdiction or section 1911(b) mandatory transfer jurisdiction, 
the two rulings were in fact harmonious. 
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether § 1911(b) transfers would require a 
section 1918 petition; no transfer issues were presented since the adoptions had 
been initiated and completed before the Tribal Councils, with no state court case 
brought.  See id. at 550–51. 
 129. 843 P.2d at 1215. 
 130. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988). 
 131. Id. at 34–36. 
 132. See F.P., 843 P.2d at 1215. 
01__HARRINGTON.DOC 6/5/2006  3:59 PM 
26 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:1 
site authority for the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 than Ne-
nana and K.E. before it.  If there were no federally recognized 
tribes in Alaska, then there was no basis for inherent tribal jurisdic-
tion regardless of whether the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 
was correct or not. 
The Alaska Supreme Court next took up the PL 280 issue in 
John v. Baker.133  By that point, intervening pronouncements by all 
three branches of the federal government had changed the land-
scape. 
First, the Department of the Interior conducted its own survey 
of the history of federal-tribal relations in Alaska and reached a 
conclusion opposite to that of the Alaska Supreme Court in Ste-
vens.134  The “Sansonetti opinion,” issued in the last days of George 
H. W. Bush’s administration, concluded that there were federally 
recognized tribes in Alaska (although specification of which Alaska 
communities qualified was left for another day).135  However, their 
authority over territory and over non-members was limited be-
cause ANCSA lands would not meet the definition of “Indian 
country.”136  The specification of tribes was supplied later that year 
in October, when the Department of the Interior issued its defini-
tive list of federally recognized tribes in Alaska, with a preamble 
making it clear that the listed villages were tribes with the same 
status as tribes in the lower 48 states.137 
 
 133. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999). 
 134. Id. at 749. 
135. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36975 (Jan. 11, 1993) at 131 (on file with author) [here-
inafter Sansonetti Opinion]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,365–66 (Oct. 21, 
1993) [hereinafter 1993 List]: 
The purpose of the current publication is to publish an Alaska list of en-
tities conforming to the intent of 25 CFR 83.6(b) and to eliminate any 
doubt as to the Department’s intention by expressly and unequivocally 
acknowledging that the Department has determined that the villages and 
regional tribes listed below are distinctly Native communities and have 
the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states.  Such acknowledge-
ment of tribal existence by the Department is a prerequisite to the pro-
tection, services, and benefits from the Federal Government available to 
Indian tribes.  This list is published to clarify that the villages and re-
gional tribes listed below are not simply eligible for services, or recog-
nized as tribes for certain narrow purposes.  Rather, they have the same 
governmental status as other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by 
virtue of their status as Indian tribes with a government-to-government 
relationship with the United States; are entitled to the same protection, 
immunities, privileges as other acknowledged tribes; have the right, sub-
ject to principles of Federal Indian law, to exercise the same inherent and 
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Second, Congress followed up in 1994 with legislative changes 
that explicitly ratified the Secretary’s authority to issue the list and 
added one Alaska tribe that the Secretary had omitted.138 
Third, in 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued an 
opinion which vindicated Solicitor Sansonetti’s view that ANCSA 
lands were not “Indian country,” thus taking 45 million acres, the 
vast majority of Native lands in Alaska, out from under that statu-
tory definition.139 
John v. Baker provided the Alaska Supreme Court with its 
first opportunity to revisit PL 280 in light of these developments.140  
The effect of the Department of the Interior’s list and the congres-
sional ratification thereof was found by the Alaska Supreme Court 
to be definitive on the tribal recognition issue.141  As to PL 280, the 
court noted that, in the absence of any showing that the case arose 
within, or that the Native Village of Northway occupied, Indian 
country, there was no need to interpret PL 280.142  Outside Indian 
country, Alaska Native Villages could exercise their inherent juris-
diction over the internal domestic relations of tribal members or 
those eligible for tribal membership, and that constituted a suffi-
cient basis for the jurisdiction of the Native Village of Northway in 
that case.143  There was also no need to consider whether to over-
rule Nenana’s interpretation of ICWA, since John v. Baker in-
volved an interparental custody dispute rather than a child protec-
tion case and was thus outside the definition of “child custody 
proceeding” in ICWA.144  The federal government, in an amicus 
brief, unsuccessfully urged the Alaska Supreme Court to reject the 
divestiture interpretation of PL 280: 
The United States argues that our prior interpretation of P.L. 
280 remains relevant even if Northway Village does not occupy 
Indian country because it would be contrary to established law 
to conclude that a tribal court had greater powers outside, rather 
 
delegated authorities available to other tribes; and are subject to the 
same limitations imposed by law on other tribes. 
 138. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454, 
108 Stat. 4791 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a, 479a-1 (2000) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1212–
15 (2000)). 
 139. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 524, 527 
(1998). 
 140. Actually, the tribal recognition issue had been raised in Hernandez v. 
Lambert, 951 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1998), but the court chose not to address it, finding 
independent state grounds on which to rule.  Id. at 439 n.4, 441 n.10. 
 141. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 749 (Alaska 1999). 
 142. Id. at 748. 
 143. See id. at 759–61. 
 144. Id. at 746–47. 
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than inside, of Indian country.  It is true that, generally, Indian 
nations possess greater powers in Indian country than they do 
outside it. . . . And at least one federal reservation does still exist 
in Alaska.  Thus, the United States correctly notes in its brief 
that the recognition of Northway’s jurisdiction creates a disjunc-
tion in Indian law jurisprudence.  But this inconsistency does not 
create a justification to address issues that are not squarely be-
fore us.145 
Thus, in the wake of John v. Baker, the non-recognition analy-
sis of Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management and Plan-
ning146 was effectively superseded.  Nenana,147 however, was still 
good law, such that section 1911(b) transfers would still require 
Secretarial petitions in state court.148  As to the divestiture interpre-
tation of PL 280, the ambiguous pronouncements in Nenana about 
whether its conclusions on section 1911(b) transfers were premised 
upon or “regardless of” PL 280 still had whatever validity they pre-
viously had.149  The geographical scope of PL 280 was, however, 
greatly reduced, by the recognition in John v. Baker that PL 280 
had no application outside the now-narrowed bounds of Indian 
country in Alaska under the Supreme Court’s 1998 Venetie tax case 
ruling.150 
The validity of Nenana, although not before the court in John 
v. Baker, was squarely before the court two years later in C.R.H.,151 
in which the court overruled Nenana and held that section 1918 re-
assumption petitions were not necessary before a state court could 
transfer a child protection case to tribal court under ICWA section 
1911(b).152  A definitive ruling on the divestiture interpretation of 
PL 280, however, was still not forthcoming: 
 
 145. Id. at 748 n.46 (citation omitted). 
 146. See In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Alaska 1992). 
 147. 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986). 
 148. See John, 982 P.2d at 748. 
 149. Id.  The court did characterize the rulings in Nenana (“[W]e interpreted § 
1918(a)’s reassumption requirement to mean that PL 280 had vested exclusive ju-
risdiction over child custody matters in state courts, and that the state exercised 
exclusive jurisdiction until a particular tribe successfully petitioned the Secretary 
of the Interior”) and F.P. (“[W]e reiterated our view that P.L. 280 had granted the 
states exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters, quoting from the portion 
of Nenana that interpreted ICWA’s § 1918(a). . . . In sum, our decisions to limit 
tribal adjudicatory power in Nenana and F.P. turned on our interpretation and 
application of ICWA and PL 280”), id. at 745–46, thus tying Nenana more strongly 
to PL 280 than Nenana itself had. 
 150. Id. at 748. 
 151. In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001). 
 152. Id. at 852. 
01__HARRINGTON.DOC 6/5/2006  3:59 PM 
2006] METLAKATLA AMENDMENT 29 
Nikolai urges us to reconsider Nenana’s interpretation of P.L. 
280, and to hold that the Alaska Native tribes affected by P.L. 
280 retain jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state.  We 
need not reach this issue, however, because the jurisdiction 
claimed by Nikolai exists regardless of P.L. 280: Subsection 
1911(b) tribal transfer jurisdiction over ICWA custody cases was 
expressly approved by Congress in enacting ICWA.  The lan-
guage and structure of section 1911 reflect congressional intent 
that all tribes, regardless of their P.L. 280 status, be able to ac-
cept transfer jurisdiction of ICWA cases from state courts.  We 
therefore hold that Nikolai may assume jurisdiction over this 
case under ICWA’s subsection 1911(b) transfer provision.  To 
the extent that Nenana, F.P., and K.E. are inconsistent with this 
decision, those cases are overruled.153 
With the divestiture interpretation soundly rejected by deci-
sions from the other mandatory PL 280 jurisdictions and with Ne-
nana, the only opinion containing language favoring the divestiture 
interpretation having been overruled in part, it would seem that 
there was no remaining precedent supporting the divestiture inter-
pretation in Alaska.  Nenana had originally reached its conclusion 
“regardless” of whether PL 280 stripped tribes of concurrent juris-
diction.  To the extent that John v. Baker and C.R.H. both may 
have characterized the holding of Nenana as having been an inter-
pretation of PL 280154 rather than an interpretation of ICWA sec-
tion 1918 “regardless” of PL 280, it is far from clear that either 
opinion could, or was meant to, give Nenana a broader scope than 
the language of Nenana would support.  With both standing for the 
proposition that PL 280 was irrelevant without a showing of Indian 
country, any interpretation that Nenana could have given to PL 280 
is even less cogent, in light of the fact that Nenana makes no men-
tion of the case having arisen within “Indian country.” 
The October 2004 opinion from the Alaska Attorney General 
purports to find much more remaining vitality in the overruled Ne-
 
 153. Id.  As in John v. Baker, the C.R.H. opinion characterized Nenana as hav-
ing interpreted PL 280: 
This court interpreted P.L. 280 in Native Village of Nenana, holding that 
through that law Congress effectively divested tribal jurisdiction and 
granted the state ‘exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the cus-
tody of Indian children.’  State jurisdiction remained exclusive, we held, 
unless a tribe governed by P.L. 280 successfully petitioned to reassume 
custody under ICWA section 1918. 
Id. at 851–52.  However, the court also noted that Nenana had based its analysis 
primarily on the language of ICWA section 1918.  Id. at 852 n.13. 
 154. See supra notes 123 and 128 and accompanying text. 
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nana line of cases than has any other court or commentator.155  It 
gives a broad reading to Nenana, beyond the section 1911(b) trans-
fer question actually at issue in that case, and it gives a broad dives-
titure application to PL 280, apparently both inside and outside In-
dian country, despite the contrary pronouncements in John v. 
Baker and C.R.H.156  It also concludes that no Alaska Native Vil-
lage has any jurisdiction over ICWA child custody proceedings 
aside from Metlakatla (because it has a reservation) and the two 
villages (Barrow and Chevak) which have had their petitions to re-
assume exclusive jurisdiction granted by the Interior Department.157  
It is not clear the extent to which this view will hold any weight 
with the courts, but it is clearly the current position of Alaska’s Ex-
ecutive Branch. 
IV.  HISTORY OF THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT 
A. PL 280 and the Metlakatla Reservation 
The Metlakatla Reservation was established statutorily in 
1891,158 somewhat incongruously, only four years after Congress 
had enacted the landmark anti-reservation pro-assimilation Dawes 
General Allotment Act in 1887.159  Eighty years later, the Metlakat-
lans again bucked the trend of history, becoming the only Alaskan 
tribe whose reservation was not revoked by the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act.160  As a result, Metlakatla is the one land 
area within Alaska whose status as Indian country is unquestioned 
today. 
In between those two bookends, however, Metlakatla’s status 
as Indian country came into question. 
A few months after the 1957 McCord decision that the Tyonek 
reservation was “Indian country,”161  Martin Reggie Booth of Met-
lakatla was charged with driving under the influence and assault 
 
 155. See Jurisdiction of State and Tribal Courts in Child Protection Matters, 
A.G. file no 661-04-0467, 2004 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 1, http://146.63.113.142/ 
pdf/opinions/opinions/661040467.pdf. 
 156. See id. at 7–8, 11–12. 
 157. Id. at 19–20; 58 Fed. Reg. 11,766 (Feb. 26, 1993) (as corrected at 58 Fed. 
Reg. 16,448 (Mar. 26, 1993)) (Metlakatla re-assuming concurrent jurisdiction); 64 
Fed. Reg. 36,391 (July 6, 1999) (Barrow and Chevak re-assuming exclusive juris-
diction). 
 158. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 25 Stat. 1101. 
 159. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388. 
 160. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (2000). 
 161. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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and battery.162  His attorney filed a motion challenging the court’s 
jurisdiction in reliance on the McCord decision, arguing that Met-
lakatla was Indian country as well.163  Before that motion could be 
decided, a plea bargain was apparently arranged;164 the assault 
charge was dismissed, and Booth pled guilty to the DUI charge in 
April 1958.165  Four days after the guilty plea was entered, the court 
issued what seems to have been a clearly advisory opinion because 
“the [g]overnment, as well as the [c]ourt, felt it was necessary to go 
fully into the question of the [c]ourt’s jurisdiction in this case, as 
well as in violations of territorial law committed in the community 
of Metlakatla, Alaska.”166  The Assistant United States Attorney 
filed a “most exhaustive brief” and “because of the excellence of 
this brief, the [c]ourt adopt[ed] the same, with a few additions and 
appropriate rewording,” concluding that Metlakatla was not Indian 
country167 and thus McCord would not preclude criminal prosecu-
tions in Metlakatla.168  Four months later, Congress added the Ter-
ritory of Alaska to PL 280, such that McCord would not preclude 
criminal prosecutions anywhere in Alaska.169 
Since 1958, this anomalous Booth ruling that Metlakatla did 
not occupy Indian country has been effectively superseded.  As 
noted above, by enacting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(“ANCSA”),170 in 1971.  Congress specifically excepted Metlakatla 
from ANCSA, such that its reservation was not revoked and its 
citizens not authorized to participate in the land and cash elements 
of the Act.171  In 1976, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that 
Metlakatla enjoyed sovereign immunity based in part on its reser-
vation status.172  And in 1998, the United States Supreme Court 
 
 162. United States v. Booth, 161 F.Supp. 269, 270 (D. Alaska 1958). 
163. See id.; see also In re McCord, 151 F.Supp.132 (D. Alaska 1957). 
164. Booth, 161 F. Supp. at 270. 
 165. Id. 
166. See id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 275. 
169. Compare United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (D. Alaska 1958) 
(dated Apr. 25, 1958) with Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 
(dated Aug. 8, 1958). 
 170. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–1629(h) (2000)). 
 171. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (2000). 
 172. See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 156 (Alaska 1976).  In subsequent 
decisions where the Alaska Supreme Court called into question the sovereign im-
munity of all other Alaska Native Villages, it was careful to carve out an exception 
for Metlakatla.  See Native Vill. of Stevens v. Alaska Mgmt. and Planning, 757 
P.2d 32, 34–35 (Alaska 1988).  The reasoning in Native Village of Stevens on the 
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seemed to cement Metlakatla’s status as Indian country in its Vene-
tie opinion.173 
Nevertheless, as of 1970 when Congress was considering the 
Metlakatla Amendment to PL 280, the Booth case had not yet 
been superseded.  A 1961 decision from the United States Supreme 
Court in Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan174 had cited Booth 
uncritically in the course of ruling that, because of Metlakatla’s 
reservation, the permission of the Secretary of the Interior for the 
Metlakatlans to use fish traps would override the State law prohibi-
tion against such traps.175  Although this ruling in some respects 
bolstered Metlakatla’s status as a reservation, it did not deal di-
rectly with Metlakatla’s status as “Indian country,” and the fact 
that the opinion apparently relied in part on Booth implied that it 
saw nothing inconsistent in allowing Booth to remain good law.  
The Booth ruling, issued about four months before PL 280 was ex-
tended to Alaska in August 1958, was to have significant implica-
tions for the 1970 amendment. 
Metlakatla had been in the habit of enforcing its tribal crimi-
nal laws for years prior to 1958, and apparently it continued doing 
so for years after 1958.176  It does not appear that after 1958 either 
the state or the federal government interfered at all with Met-
lakatla’s enforcement of its tribal criminal laws, at least initially.177  
Metlakatla was completely unaware that anyone thought it had lost 
its tribal criminal jurisdiction until some point in the mid-1960s,178 
 
non-immunity of Alaska Native Villages has been effectively superseded by the 
opinion in Runyon v. Ass’n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 438–39 
(Alaska 2004) (“Each of AVCP’s member tribes is therefore protected by tribal 
sovereign immunity.”). 
 173. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.2 
(1998). 
 174. 369 U.S. 45 (1962). 
 175. Id. at 51–52, 57–58.  By contrast, in the companion case of Organized Vil-
lage of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), the state prohibition overrode the Secre-
tarial authorization in the villages of Kake and Angoon, which did not have reser-
vations.  Kake, 369 U.S. at 62. 
 176. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784.  
The Metlakatlans created a model community. . . . They set up rules for 
the election of a mayor and council.  They arranged for their own com-
munity to furnish governmental services, including education. . . . They 
also enforced law and order as far as misdemeanor offenses were con-
cerned.  Major offenses were the responsibility of the Federal Govern-
ment. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 4785. 
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when the community set about trying to have the loss of jurisdic-
tion addressed. 
This led Metlakatla to support an effort that had started in the 
early 1960s to enact a major amendment to PL 280.  The following 
section tracks that effort and its ultimate outcome. 
B. Metlakatla and the Indian Civil Rights Act 
The effort to amend PL 280 was spearheaded by the Senate’s 
Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, chaired by the 
redoubtable Senator Sam Ervin Jr. of North Carolina. 
Starting in 1961 and concluding in March, 1963, the subcom-
mittee held exploratory hearings in nine states, with eighty-five 
tribal representatives testifying.179  Since the Federal Constitution 
had no application to tribal governments, the subcommittee’s main 
concern had been that individuals had no constitutional protections 
against excesses by such governments.180  As the hearings pro-
gressed, however, the committee reached the conclusion that the 
lack of constitutional protections was only part of the problem, and 
that PL 280 had resulted in a breakdown in the administration of 
justice to such a degree that Indians were being denied due process 
and equal protection of the law.181 
Nine legislative proposals encompassing the subcommittee’s 
suggestions were introduced by Senator Ervin in the closing days of 
the 88th Congress in July 1964,182 and the same nine were intro-
duced again in the early days of the 89th Congress in February 
1965.183  One of the bills—numbered S. 966 in the 89th Congress—
proposed to revoke section 7 (the “optional” section) of the origi-
nal PL 280184 with a proviso that any already-existing cession of ju-
risdiction from the United States to a particular state would not be 
 
Strangely enough, neither the territorial nor the Federal Government no-
tified Metlakatla after enactment of the new statute to inform the com-
munity that its court and police had lost their authority to function.  In the 
midsixties [sic], when this fact became known, the community discontin-
ued its practice of employing a magistrate and police. 
 179. 110 CONG. REC. 17326 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin); S. REP. NO. 89-
1553, at 6 (1966). 
 180. S. REP. NO. 89-1553, at 6–7. 
 181. Id. at 8–9. 
 182. See 110 CONG. REC. 17326 (July 29, 1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin); S. 
3043, 88th Cong. (1964) (addressing PL 280). 
 183. See 111 CONG. REC. 1799 (Feb. 2, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin); see also 
S. 966, 89th Cong. (1965) (addressing PL 280). 
 184. Section 7 dealt with assertion of jurisdiction by “optional” PL 280 states.  
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 §7, 67 Stat. 588 (not codified). 
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affected.185  Future extensions of PL 280 jurisdiction by a state 
would still be possible, but only with the consent of the affected 
tribe.  The bill also included a provision under which a state could 
retrocede any jurisdiction it had obtained under either the civil sec-
tion or the criminal section of PL 280, or under the “optional” sec-
tion 7.186 
Hearings were held during the 89th Congress in June 1965, 
which indicated that S. 966 was the most popular of the set of bills: 
Senate Bill 966 drew from Indians or their representatives more 
support than was given to any of the other bills before the sub-
committee.  With few exceptions, the experiences of Indian 
tribes under State jurisdiction, as provided for in Public Law 280, 
was said to be almost wholly unsatisfactory. 
Other groups or individuals stated similar views.  Not all wit-
nesses were critical of State jurisdiction, to be sure, but it is sig-
nificant to note that in those instances which satisfaction with 
State jurisdiction was indicated, the assumption of that jurisdic-
tion followed State consultation with or consent of the tribes 
concerned. 
Not everyone who favored S. 966 was wholly in accord with the 
present version of the bill.  The most frequently proposed 
change was one providing for piecemeal or partial extension of 
State jurisdiction to the reservation area.187 
Although S. 966 did not pass during the 89th Congress, a similar 
package (slimmed down somewhat by the elimination of two of the 
prior bills and consolidation of two others, leaving five bills and 
one joint resolution) was introduced in the 90th Congress in May 
1967.188  This bill, S. 1845, contained the PL 280 amendment that 
had been in S. 966 the previous session. 
The fate of S. 1845 and its companion Indian Civil Rights bills 
became entwined with that of another bill, H.R. 2516, a controver-
sial general civil rights bill which the House passed and conveyed 
to the Senate in August 1967. Senator Ervin was determined to 
have the Indian Civil Rights provisions of S. 1845 and its compan-
ions inserted into H.R. 2516.  Under his chairmanship, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, on October 12, 1967, ap-
proved an amended H.R. 2516 (which differed substantially from 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. S. Rep. No. 89-1553, at 13 (1966). The Report also notes that another 
question arose as to how consent of the Indian people would be obtained, and that 
the bill would have to be amended in order to provide the necessary machinery 
for determining this consent or lack thereof. 
 188. S. 1843–1847, 90th Cong. (1967).  S.J. Res. 87, 90th Cong (1967).  S. 1845 
essentially contained the same provisions as S. 966 in the 89th Congress. 
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the version passed by the House), and inserted the Indian Civil 
Rights provisions, including the PL 280 changes.  However, the full 
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the subcommittee’s amend-
ment on October 25, 1967, reverting to language similar to that 
which the House had originally passed.189 
While the controversy over H.R. 2516 made its way toward the 
Senate floor, the Senate Judiciary Committee took up the narrower 
S. 1845 and its companions, condensed them into a single bill (S. 
1843) and issued a favorable report on December 6, 1967.190  Senate 
Bill 1843 passed on December 7, and included the amendment to 
PL 280.191 
In the meantime, H.R. 2516, without Senator Ervin’s language, 
proved to be a tremendously controversial and time-consuming bill 
on the floor of the Senate in early 1968.  As the bill labored its way 
through extended debate and repeated attempts at cloture votes, 
Senator Ervin eventually succeeded on the Senate floor where he 
had failed before the Judiciary Committee.192  Thus, the Indian 
Civil Rights provisions of S. 1843, including the changes to PL 280, 
were incorporated into H.R. 2516.193  With that amendment in-
cluded, H.R. 2516 passed the Senate194 and went back to the House, 
which agreed to the Senate’s changes.195  On April 11, 1968, H.R. 
2516 became Public Law 90-284, Title IV of which contained the 
amendments to PL 280, albeit with most of its legislative history at-
tached to a separate, un-enacted bill.196 
Metlakatla followed these developments with interest; the 
Congressional Record contains a letter from John W. Smith, Act-
ing Mayor of the Metlakatla Indian Community, stating, “We are 
on record to fully support Senator Sam J. Ervin’s Indian rights bill 
as an amendment to H.R. 2516 when the civil rights measure comes 
before the Senate.  We especially want to amend law 280 to clear 
up jurisdiction on our tribal land.”197 
 
 189. S. Rep. No. 90-721 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1838, 
1848, 1854, 1863. 
 190. See generally S. Rep. No. 90-841 (1967). 
 191. 113 CONG. REC. 35473 (Dec. 7, 1967). 
 192. See 114 CONG. REC. 5838 (Mar. 8, 1968). 
 193. See id. 
 194. 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (Mar. 11, 1968). 
 195. 114 CONG. REC. 9553, 9621 (Apr. 10, 1968). 
 196. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968). 
 197. 113 CONG. REC. 35,475 (Dec. 7, 1967).  The letter is undated but was 
probably written in November 1967, like the other letters with which it appears.  It 
is included with materials in the Congressional Record accompanying passage of 
S. 1843 by the Senate in December 1967. 
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Metlakatla’s optimism that H.R. 2516 (which later became 
Public Law 90-284) would clear up its jurisdiction problems was 
logical.  The 1968 amendments “reflected the shift in national pol-
icy toward Indians, from an assimilationist approach, to a policy 
promoting tribal self-governance and self-reliance.”198  Although 
they did not answer the question of whether PL 280 in 1953 had di-
vested tribes of their jurisdiction, the 1968 amendments made that 
question less important, at least in situations where the affected 
tribe and the State were in agreement as to the division of jurisdic-
tional responsibility between them, as was the case between Met-
lakatla and Alaska.199  After the 1968 amendments, a tribe and state 
which were in agreement as to the division of jurisdictional respon-
sibility between them within the tribe’s Indian country could im-
plement that agreement without need for further federal legisla-
tion.  If the State had too much jurisdiction, it could retrocede; if 
the State had too little, it could extend its jurisdiction, with the con-
sent of the Tribe.200 
So what prohibited Metlakatla and the State of Alaska after 
1968 from implementing their agreement without going back to 
Congress?  The answer requires a closer reading of state legislative 
materials. 
C. Metlakatla and the State Retrocession Bill 
Metlakatla and the State of Alaska did in fact try to utilize the 
1968 amendment to PL 280 to re-vest jurisdiction in the Tribe, and 
in 1969, came very close to doing so. 
Senator Robert Ziegler of Ketchikan, on March 14, 1969, in-
troduced Senate Bill 266, “[a]n Act relating to criminal jurisdiction 
 
 198. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 199. If PL 280 did strip the tribes of jurisdiction, then retrocession to the 
United States would return jurisdiction to the tribe.  See, e.g., Umatilla Indian 
Reservation; Oregon’s Acceptance of Retrocession of Jurisdiction, 46 Fed. Reg. 
2195 (Jan. 8, 1981) (“Through retrocession to the United States, criminal jurisdic-
tion will return to the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla India Reservation.”).  
If PL 280 left tribal jurisdiction intact, then of course the tribe would have never 
lost it in the first place. 
 200. Simultaneously, other portions of the Indian Civil Rights Act limited tribal 
court sentencing authority to six months, and fines to $500.  Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 
Pub. L. No.. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).  The limitation was later enlarged to 
one year and $5,000. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 1302 (2000)).  Thus, tribal court authority was effectively limited to mis-
demeanor-level crimes. 
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on the Annette Island.”201  As introduced, the bill added a new sec-
tion 12.05.012 to the Alaska Statutes, which read: 
Jurisdiction of Annette Islands: 
Subject to acceptance by the United States, as provided in Sec-
tion 403 of the Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79, 25 
U.S.C. Sec. 1323, there is hereby retroceded to the United States 
to be exercised concurrently with the jurisdiction of the State of 
Alaska, measures of criminal jurisdiction on the Annette Islands 
as was exercised by it immediately prior to the date of the en-
actment of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1958, (Pub. L. 85-
615) 72 Stat. 545.202 
Following referral to the Judiciary Committee, a committee substi-
tute was offered on March 25, which added an effective date.203 This 
clause made the bill effective the day after its passage and approval 
by the Governor, or the day it would become law without approval.  
As amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee and reported back 
on March 25,204 the bill passed the Senate on March 26 and the 
House on April 4, both unanimously. 205 
It was, however, vetoed by then-Governor Miller.  The veto 
message indicated that the Governor did not necessarily disagree 
 
 201. See S. 266, 6th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1969). 
 202. See id. 
 203. 1969 Alaska S. J. 457. The committee substitute changed the wording of 
the new ALASKA STAT. § 12.05.020, but the changes were citational or grammati-
cal, not substantive: 
Subject to acceptance by the United States, as provided in Section 403 of 
the Act of Congress of April 11, 1968; P.L. 90-284; 82 Stat. 79 (which 
added 25 U.S.C., Sec. 1323), there is retroceded to the United States, to 
be exercised concurrently with the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska, 
such measures of criminal jurisdiction on the Annette Islands as were ex-
ercised by it immediately prior to the date of the enactment of the Act of 
Congress of August 8, 1958 (Pub. L. 85-615) 72 Stat. 545 (which amended 
18 U.S.C., Sec 1162 and 28 U.S.C., sec. 1360). 
Alaska Comm. Substitute (Judiciary) for S. B. 266, 6th Leg., 1st Session (1969). 
 204. Id.  The committee substitute added a section 2 (“This Act takes effect on 
the day after its passage and approval or on the day it becomes law without ap-
proval”) and slightly reworded the new section 12.05.020 to read: 
Jurisdiction of Annette Islands.  Subject to acceptance by the United 
States, as provided in Section 403 of the Act of Congress of April 11, 
1968; PL 90-284; 82 Stat. 79 (which added 25 U.S.C., Sec. 1323), there is 
retroceded to the United States, to be exercised concurrently with the ju-
risdiction of the State of Alaska, such measures of criminal jurisdiction 
on the Annette Islands as were exercised by it immediately before the 
enactment of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1958; P.L. 85-615; 72 Stat. 
545 (which amended 18 U.S.C., Sec 1162 and 28 U.S.C., sec. 1360). 
Comm. Substitute for S. B. No. 266 (6th Leg., 1st Sess.). 
 205. The bill passed 15-0 in the Senate and 39-0 in the House. 1969 Alaska S. J. 
479 (March 26, 1969); 1969 Alaska H. J. 627 (April 4, 1969). 
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with the bill’s goal, but thought that the bill would not achieve that 
goal: 
A careful study of the Federal law, under which retrocession was 
to occur, revealed that the Bill does not accomplish its objective 
because (1) only areas defined as Indian country qualify for ret-
rocession of criminal jurisdiction to the Federal Government 
under 25 U.S.C. 1323; and (2) according to the Case of United 
States versus Booth, 17 Alaska 561, 161 F. Supp. 269 (Alaska 
1958), the Annette Islands are not Indian country, within the 
meaning of the pertinent Federal provisions.  Thus, regardless of 
the merits of the Bill’s objectives, present law appears to pre-
clude the Federal Government from accepting criminal jurisdic-
tion over the Annette Islands.206 
Although it seems anomalous today to consider Metlakatla as not 
being Indian country, the law as of 1970 and the continued validity 
vel non of the Booth opinion, were not clear.  And, one cannot 
otherwise fault the logic of the veto message: if Metlakatla was in-
deed not “Indian country,” then retrocession of jurisdiction would 
be a legal impossibility, since Alaska’s jurisdiction over Metlakatla 
would not be a function of PL 280 at all.  Nor was this a problem 
that a state legislative enactment could rectify; only the federal 
government could specify whether a given area was “Indian coun-
try.” 
Thus, Metlakatla had to go back to Congress.  The important 
point, however, is that the reason it had to go back to Congress was 
not because of the divestiture interpretation of PL 280 itself, as that 
particular aspect of the problem had already been solved.  Assum-
ing that PL 280 had stripped the tribe of all jurisdiction, the coop-
eration and acquiescence of the State of Alaska would suffice to  
restore such jurisdiction.  Rather, Metlakatla had to go back to 
Congress because, if Booth was still good law and Metlakatla did 
not occupy Indian country, the State could not retrocede anything 
 
 206. 1969 Alaska S. J. 833 (April 24, 1969).  The Governor also expressed legal 
hesitance that the State of Alaska could retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction 
over “Indian country.”  This concern was unfounded; it has since developed that 
partial retrocession is permissible. See, e.g., Umatilla Indian Reservation; Ore-
gon’s Acceptance of Retrocession of Jurisdiction, 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (Jan. 8, 1981) 
(retroceding criminal jurisdiction only).  Further, even had it been the case that 
Alaska had had to retrocede jurisdiction completely, it could have, with the con-
sent of the people of Metlakatla, re-assumed partial jurisdiction over limited sub-
ject matter areas under the newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1321. 
The Governor also expressed confusion over whether the federal government 
could apply federal criminal statutes, while in the past the federal government had 
applied territorial criminal statutes.  This too seems to have been a secondary is-
sue. 
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under the 1968 amendments, since PL 280, both in its original 1958 
version and its post-1968 version, would be irrelevant.  Moreover, 
only Congress could specify that the Annette Islands Reserve was 
Indian country; this, and not the divestiture interpretation, was why 
Metlakatla had to go back to Congress. 
We now turn to the specifics of the 1970 Metlakatla Amend-
ment itself.  The following two sections analyze the amendment to 
subsection (a) and to subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1162. 
V.  THE METLAKATLA AMENDMENT 
A. The 1970 Amendment and Subsection (a) 
Listing Metlakatla as Indian country for purposes of PL 280 
was not as simple as it might have first seemed.  The legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress at least initially thought that the sim-
plest solution would be to list Metlakatla as a reservation under 18 
U.S.C. § 1162(a): “S. 902 . . . would give Metlakatla status similar to 
that enjoyed by the Warm Springs Indians of Oregon and the Red 
Lake Indians of Minnesota.”207 
But Metlakatla was not seeking status similar to those of 
Warm Springs and Red Lake; within those two reservations, state 
jurisdiction did not run at all.208  Metlakatla was not objecting to the 
existence of Alaska’s jurisdiction, it was only objecting to the loss 
of its own jurisdiction.  As Metlakatla was now limited to imposing 
prison sentences of six months or less by the Indian Civil Rights 
Act,209 it is likely that both Metlakatla and the State of Alaska 
would have objected to a provision that had the effect of stripping 
the State of its jurisdiction entirely.  Listing Metlakatla in the same 
way that Warm Springs and Red Lake were listed would accom-
plish the goal of denominating Metlakatla as Indian country for the 
 
 207. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1545, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4785.  
These are the two tribes listed as exceptions to the application of PL 280 in 18 
U.S.C. § 1162(a). The Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin had originally been a third 
exception, but was removed from that list in 1954. 
 208. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 810 (Alaska, 1999) (Matthews, J., dissenting): 
  On excepted reservations, such as Red Lake, the writ of state law under 
PL 280 did not run. With respect to Metlakatla, Congress intended that 
state law would continue to apply but that the Metlakatla Indian commu-
nity would have concurrent jurisdiction over those offenses committed by 
Indians which would be within the jurisdiction of tribes located in areas 
where PL 280 does not apply. 
 209. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), amended by Pub. L. No. 909-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77.  
This was amended in 1986 to allow for terms of up to one year.  Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146. 
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purposes of PL 280.  However, this would have the unhappy conse-
quences of shutting out the State from exercising criminal jurisdic-
tion, and forcing the federal government to start exercising such ju-
risdiction over major offenses, a result not desired by Metlakatla, 
Alaska, or the United States. 
Metlakatla wanted to be listed as an area of Indian country 
over which PL 280 was extended.  However, the tabular structure 
of section 1162(a) did not lend itself readily to that, as the only spe-
cifically named reservations were the exceptions, which PL 280 did 
not reach.  Thus, if Metlakatla was going to be named in the same 
way as Red Lake and Warm Springs, some extra language would 
be necessary in order to distinguish Metlakatla from those two res-
ervations.  To this end, the bill, as originally introduced, provided: 
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except that on 
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian commu-
nity may exercise concurrently such jurisdiction as 
was vested in it immediately prior to the date of en-
actment of the Act of August 8, 1958 (72 Stat. 
545).210 
This language apparently led to concerns within the Depart-
ments of Justice and the Interior that Metlakatla’s jurisdiction prior 
to 1958 might have exceeded the limits imposed as of 1968 by the 
Indian Civil Rights Act.  The Justice Department suggested that 
the last clause be amended to read “as was vested in it prior to the 
enactment of Public Law 85-615, subject to the provisions of title II 
of Public Law 90-284.”211  The Interior Department suggested the 
following language: 
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except that on 
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian commu-
nity may exercise jurisdiction over the offenses 
committed by Indians in the same manner in which 
such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in 
Indian country over which State jurisdiction has not 
been extended and subject to the provisions of title 
II of the act of April 11, 1968.212 
The elimination of the word “concurrent” in the Interior’s 
proposed language from the original bill apparently raised con-
cerns that this might make Metlakatla’s jurisdiction exclusive, but a 
 
 210. 116 CONG. REC. 32,585 (Sept. 18, 1970). 
 211. Letter from Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Hon. James O. 
Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, included with H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-1545, (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4787–88. 
 212. Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Sec. of the Interior, to Hon. James O. 
Eastland, Chairman of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, included with 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4768–87. 
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letter from the Interior Department assured the Senate that its new 
language would have the effect of allowing Metlakatla to exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction: 
The authority over minor crimes conferred on the Metlakatla 
community by this bill will be concurrent with that authority ex-
ercised by the State of Alaska over Indian people living in the 
Metlakatla community.  The bill does not confer on the Met-
lakatla community exclusive jurisdiction over minor crimes 
committed by its people on the reservation.213 
As enacted by the Senate, the bill included the Interior’s lan-
guage but excluded the final clause referring to ICRA, as the Sen-
ate felt that compliance with ICRA should be understood and need 
not be explicit: 
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except that on 
the Annette Islands, the Metlakatla Indian commu-
nity may exercise jurisdiction over the offenses 
committed by Indians in the same manner in which 
such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in 
Indian country over which State jurisdiction has not 
been extended.214 
This is the language that ultimately became law.215 
It is necessary to acknowledge that the legislative history con-
tains statements which suggest that Metlakatla had lost its jurisdic-
tion as a result of the extension of PL 280 to Alaska in 1958.216  As 
such, even a superficial read of the legislative history would lead 
 
 213. Id. at 4787–88. 
 214. Loesch Letter, supra note 43: 
On September 18, 1970, the Senate passed S. 902 with the Department’s 
amendment, except that the last clause of that amendment, “and subject 
to the provisions of Title II of the Act of April 11, 1968,” was deleted by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee as being redundant.  It was the opinion 
of the Committee and the Senate that the phrase “. . . in the same man-
ner in which such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian 
country over which State jurisdiction has not been extended,” and the 
wording of the Act of April 11, 1968 itself, would subject the Metlakatla 
Indian Community to the provisions of that Act. 
We are inclined to agree with that interpretation and would have no ob-
jection to House passage of the Senate modification of the Department’s 
recommended amendment. 
 215. Almost unnoticed was the change from “[a]ll Indian country with the Ter-
ritory” to “[a]ll Indian country within the State,” an acknowledgment, twelve 
years after the fact, that Alaska was no longer a territory.  The corresponding 
change in the statute’s civil counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, was not made until 
1984. 
 216. The legislative history also contains statements inconsistent with this di-
vestiture interpretation, as discussed infra Part V.B. in the analysis of the amend-
ment to subsection (c). 
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one to the conclusion that Congress in 1970 was being told, as Met-
lakatla had been told, that PL 280 was the legal vehicle by which 
Metlakatla had lost its jurisdiction.  But the question is whether the 
Metlakatla Amendment memorialized that belief into statutory 
law, and the answer is that nothing in the amendment to subsection 
(a) did so.  The point is not that Congress believed that PL 280 left 
tribes with concurrent jurisdiction, but rather that Congress did not 
need to believe that PL 280 had stripped tribes of their jurisdiction 
in order to see the necessity of amending subsection (a) to list Met-
lakatla.  The divestiture question had become secondary as of 1970 
because, in light of the 1968 amendments, any problem stemming 
from a divestiture interpretation of PL 280 was remediable by an 
agreement between Metlakatla and Alaska.  What was not remedi-
able was the supposed absence of Indian country in Metlakatla, 
and the legislative history makes it clear that Congress recognized 
the need to delineate Metlakatla as Indian country: 
[W]e feel this language is needed in view of the position taken by 
the State of Alaska in April of this year when Governor Miller 
vetoed a bill passed by the legislature which would have retro-
ceded certain criminal jurisdiction held by the State over An-
nette Islands to the Federal Government because the Annette 
Islands are not Indian country within the meaning of the perti-
nent Federal provisions.217 
The extra language surrounding Metlakatla’s place on the list was 
necessary to distinguish it from Red Lake and Warm Springs. The 
Interior Department suggested the following phraseology be in-
cluded: “in the same manner in which such jurisdiction may be ex-
ercised by Indian tribes in Indian country over which State jurisdic-
tion has not been extended,”218 not to specify that Metlakatla had 
had no jurisdiction prior to the amendment or to imply that con-
current state/tribal jurisdiction was the status quo in areas of Indian 
country over which PL 280 did not reach, but rather to replace the 
reference to Metlakatla’s pre-1958 jurisdiction (which might have 
exceeded the limits of the Indian Civil Rights Act) with an analogy 
to present-day tribal jurisdiction unaffected by PL 280 (which 
would have to comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act). 
 
 217. Letter from Fred J. Russell, Under Sec. of the Interior, to Hon. James O. 
Eastland, Chair of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (June 2, 1970), in-
cluded with H.R. Rep. No. 91-1545 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 
4787. 
 218. Id. 
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B. The 1970 Amendment and Subsection (c) 
The same amendment added ten words to the end of subsec-
tion (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1162.  Before the amendment, the subsection 
read: 
The provision of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not 
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsec-
tion (a) of this section.219 
Following the amendment, subsection (c) read: 
The provision of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not 
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsec-
tion (a) of this section as areas over which the several states have 
exclusive jurisdiction.220 
The dissent in John v. Baker made the assumption that “exclusive” 
must refer to “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction,” and thus concluded 
that the addition of these words constituted explicit congressional 
endorsement that PL 280 stripped tribes of their jurisdiction.  Thus, 
the natural question is whether this clause means “exclusive of 
tribal jurisdiction” or “exclusive of federal sections 1152 and 1153 
jurisdiction.”221 
It must be remembered that sections 1152 and 1153 are the 
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act, laws which create 
jurisdiction for federal prosecutions in federal courts.  This alone 
indicates that Congress was addressing the demarcation between 
state jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction, not that between state ju-
risdiction and tribal jurisdiction.  In other words, in areas where PL 
280 gave criminal jurisdiction to the states under subsection (a), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 should not apply to give concurrent crimi-
nal jurisdiction to the United States. Conversely, in those areas ex-
empted from the application of PL 280 (i.e., Red Lake and Warm 
Springs), sections 1152 and 1153 should apply so that major crimes, 
outside the scope of state PL 280 jurisdiction and outside tribal 
prosecutorial authority post-ICRA, can be federally prosecuted. 
 
 219. Loesch Letter, supra note 43. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Or, perhaps, “exclusive of both”; but the problems of interpreting it to 
mean that prove to be the same as those analyzed infra accompanying an interpre-
tation of “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.” 
The more precise phrase “exclusive of federal sections 1152 and 1153 jurisdic-
tion” is used rather than the simpler “exclusive of federal jurisdiction,” because 
federal criminal laws of general applicability (i.e., defining crimes regardless of 
where committed) remain in effect within Indian country regardless of 18 U.S.C. § 
1162.  See United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1164 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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But the legislative history gives us a bit more insight than that.  
As noted above, the reference in the original pre-1970 subsection 
(c) to “the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this 
section” was an ambiguous reference, in that there are two catego-
ries of Indian country listed in subsection (a)—those covered by PL 
280 and those exempted.  The awkwardness of fitting Metlakatla 
into that list highlighted the list’s bifurcated nature.  The motiva-
tion for the addition of the ten words—”as areas over which the 
several states have exclusive jurisdiction”—was to clarify that, of 
the two lists of Indian country in subsection (a), the list to which 
sections 1152 and 1153 would not apply was the list to which PL 
280 itself did apply: i.e., those areas where the states had jurisdic-
tion under PL 280, to be exclusive under sections 1152 and 1153. 
The ten words being added to subsection (c) seemed to take 
the Interior Department by surprise; they had apparently not been 
in the House Bill on which Interior had submitted its written com-
ments in June 1970, and it was apparent that Interior would have 
preferred that they not be in the Senate Bill either. 
We also note that S. 902 as passed by the Senate contains a Sec-
tion 2 which was not included in H.R. 6782 and which reads: 
“Sec. 2.  Subsection (c) of section 1162 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows: ‘(c) The provisions of sec-
tions 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable within 
the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section 
as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.’” 
The italicized language is new.  It is not discussed in the reports 
on the bill submitted by this Department and by the Department 
of Justice, nor in the reports of the House and Senate Commit-
tees on the Judiciary, nor in any of the testimony, floor action, or 
elsewhere in the background of the Senate S. 902.  This Depart-
ment’s report had, at least inferentially, recommended that Sec-
tion 2 be deleted from the bill.222 
The Interior Department’s concern led Senators Stevens, Gravel 
and Ervin to write a reassuring letter to Rep. Celler, to whose 
House Committee the Senate Bill was being referred following its 
passage by the Senate: 
It has come to our attention that the Department of the Interior 
has raised a small question over the meaning of certain words in 
S. 902, which is designed to permit the Metlakatla Indians of the 
Annette Islands to have responsibility for maintaining law and 
order in their own community.  This question concerns the 
meaning of the words “as areas over which the several states 
have exclusive jurisdiction,” in section 2 of the bill. 
 
 222. Loesch Letter, supra note 43. 
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This phrase adds new language to 18 United States Code 
1162(c), which excludes the application of federal criminal provi-
sions, sections 1152 and 1153, from those areas over which the 
states have jurisdiction.  The additional language is descriptive 
only, and is not meant to change the meaning of 1162(c).  It was 
added because subsection (c) refers to the “Indian country listed 
in subsection (a)” and that list includes Indian country not under 
state jurisdiction, as well as areas that are.  Obviously sections 
1152 and 1153 are meant to apply to the former category.  The 
additional language is not intended to have any bearing on ac-
tual or potential arrangements between states and the tribes with 
respect to the allocation of law enforcement responsibility be-
tween them. 
While the additional language is perhaps unnecessary, it was 
added for purposes of clarity.  We believe it would be more con-
fusing if the words were deleted at this late date in the legislative 
process.  We hope that this letter of explanation will obviate any 
problems which might further delay the passage of the bill.223 
This letter had apparently mollified the Interior Department: 
As a result of discussions between representatives of this De-
partment and the staffs of your committee and the correspond-
ing Senate Committee, a letter was addressed to you on October 
14, 1970, by Senators Ervin, Stevens and Gravel, the principal 
sponsors and managers of S. 902.  The letter explains that the 
new language of 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) which would be added by 
Section 2 of S. 902 was descriptive only, and was not intended to 
change the meaning of § 1162(c) “nor to have any bearing on ac-
tual or potential arrangements between states and the tribes 
which [sic] respect to the allocation of law enforcement authori-
ties between them.” 
With this understanding, which we interpret to mean that the 
amendatory language will have no effect on whatever inherent ju-
risdiction particular Indian tribes have may retained in states 
which were given or have assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Act 
of August 8, 1958, 72 Stat. 545, as amended and supplemented by 
Title II of the Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, we would not 
object to House passage of S. 902.224 
There are two dimensions to the significance of these parts of 
the legislative history.  First, it is significant to note that the ten 
 
 223. Letter from Sens. Ted Stevens, Mike Gravel, and Sam J. Ervin Jr. to Hon. 
Emanuel Celler, Chair of House Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 14, 1970), 115 CONG. REC. 
37,354 & 37,355 (Nov. 16, 1970). 
 224. Loesch Letter, supra note 43 (emphasis added).  The letters to Represen-
tative Celler from Assistant Secretary Loesch and from Senators Erwin, Gravel 
and Stevens were included in the Congressional Record, and Representatitve 
Donohue, in his remarks, re-affirmed the substance of the letter.  115 CONG. REC. 
37,354 (Nov. 16, 1970). 
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words were added not to have any implication for tribal authority, 
but to clarify that sections 1152 and 1153 were to apply where PL 
280 did not, and were not to apply where PL 280 did (more specifi-
cally, in those areas of Indian country within “mandatory” PL 280 
states and not excepted from PL 280’s operation).  In other words, 
the ten words dealt with the demarcation between state jurisdiction 
and federal jurisdiction, not between state jurisdiction and tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Second, it is even more significant that the legislative history 
makes reference to “actual or potential arrangements between 
states and the tribes with respect to the allocation of law enforce-
ment authorities between them,” and “whatever inherent jurisdic-
tion particular Indian tribes may have retained in states which were 
given or have assumed jurisdiction pursuant to [PL 280].”225  Both 
certainly imply residual tribal law enforcement authority.  The 
former could perhaps be explained as a function of the possibility 
of state-tribal agreements under the 1968 amendment; but the lat-
ter directly posits that the Department of the Interior was contem-
plating that inherent jurisdiction could have survived the enact-
ment of PL 280. 
Such statements are clearly inconsistent with the notion that 
the Department of the Interior was monolithically adhering to its 
1954 position that there was no tribal jurisdiction within Indian 
country covered by PL 280.  As such, it cannot be said that Con-
gress was ratifying that prior position when it enacted the 1970 
amendment. 
It appears that as of 1970, Interior was on the cusp of a dra-
matic shift in its view of the divestiture interpretation of PL 280.  
The eventual 1978 Solicitor’s Opinion, which officially overruled its 
prior divestiture pronouncements from 1954 and 1961, noted that 
in 1976 “this office ha[d] already expressed the view that Pub. L. 
280 did not divest Indian tribes of their part of the previously-
existing concurrent Federal-tribal jurisdiction but transferred only 
Federal jurisdiction to the States.”226  The Opinion further noted 
that even prior to the 1976 memorandum, the Interior Depart-
ment’s actions had not always been consistent with the 1954 memo-
randum, including certification as far back as 1973 that several 
tribes in PL 280 states were performing law and order functions.227  
Thus, the November 10, 1970 letter appears to have been an early 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Solic. Mem. Op. M-36907, 6 INDIAN L. REP. H-1, H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978) (cit-
ing Solic. Mem. Op. (July 13, 1976). 
 227. Id. (referencing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
82 Stat. 197). 
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harbinger of Interior’s 1973 certifications, its 1976 letter, and its ul-
timate 1978 recognition that PL 280 did not deprive tribes of inher-
ent jurisdiction. 
There is one further point to the analysis of subsection (c), 
which starts by posing the question, did Congress intend that 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 apply within Metlakatla? 
The answer to that question is no.  There is nothing in the text 
or the legislative history of the 1970 amendment that would indi-
cate that Congress wanted the General Crimes Act or the Major 
Crimes Act to apply to Metlakatla.  In fact, in the legislative history 
one finds several inferences that Congress did not contemplate that 
the amendment would allow enforcement of federal criminal laws 
or require federal resources to be expended.228 
With that answer in mind, is it possible to interpret the term 
“exclusive” in subsection (c) to mean “exclusive of tribal jurisdic-
tion”?  If so, that would mean that sections 1152 and 1153 do not 
apply in areas where the state has jurisdiction “exclusive of tribal 
jurisdiction.”  Thus, since the state’s jurisdiction in Metlakatla is 
clearly concurrent with, and not exclusive of, Metlakatla’s jurisdic-
tion, sections 1152 and 1153 necessarily do apply within Metlakatla, 
and jurisdiction over major crimes is shared between the state and 
federal governments—directly contrary to what Congress intended.  
If, however, “exclusive” in subsection (c) is interpreted to mean 
“exclusive of federal [sections] 1152 and 1153 jurisdiction,” then 
the state’s PL 280 jurisdiction within Metlakatla does meet that cri-
terion, and sections 1152 and 1153 do not apply within Metlakatla, 
consistent with congressional intent.229  Under that latter consistent 
interpretation, the ten words in subsection (c) serve only to confirm 
that PL 280 criminal jurisdiction in Alaska and other mandatory 
PL 280 states is mutually exclusive with sections 1152 and 1153 
criminal jurisdiction in the federal government, a logical result.  It 
 
 228. H. Rep. No. 91-1545, Sep. 30, 1970, accompanying S. 902, reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4783, 4784 (“Authority over major criminal offenses in the Indian 
community would remain exclusively with the State of Alaska”); 116 CONG. REC. 
37,355 (Nov. 16, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Pollock) (“I should add in closing that, 
according to the Interior Department report, the enactment of S. 902 will not gen-
erate any immediate need for Federal monetary assistance since prior to 1958, 
Metlakatla was able to finance its law and order program exclusively from local 
funds.”). 
 229. And, if the term “exclusive” in subsection (c) means exclusive of federal 
and of tribal jurisdiction, then again, Metlakatla’s clearly concurrent jurisdiction 
within the reservation means that Metlakatla doesn’t fit that criterion, so sections 
1152 and 1153 apply, and Alaska’s jurisdiction in Metlakatla is exclusive of neither 
tribal nor federal jurisdiction. 
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may be argued that this is almost tautological; sections 1152 and 
1153 are federal jurisdictional statutes, so the clause in subsection 
(c) merely specifies that these federal jurisdictional statutes do not 
apply in areas where state jurisdiction is exclusive of federal juris-
diction, a statement that is perhaps unnecessary.  But this is en-
tirely consistent with the observation in the legislative history that 
“while the clause is perhaps unnecessary, it is added for purposes 
of clarity.”230 
Moreover, the conundrum created by interpreting “exclusive” 
in subsection (c) to mean “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction” only 
worsens when one considers that all other Indian country affected 
by PL 280 is effectively in the same position as Metlakatla (i.e., ju-
risdiction is shared by the tribe and the corresponding state gov-
ernment). Thus, if “exclusive” in subsection (c) does mean exclu-
sive of tribal jurisdiction, then sections 1152 and 1153 apply in all 
such areas, and in fact everywhere that PL 280 applies.  With such a 
reading, the original “unfunded mandate” purpose of PL 280, re-
placing federal prosecution with state prosecution, fails entirely. 
Of course, it might be argued by some that, in all other areas 
of Indian country outside Metlakatla, the state, tribal and federal 
courts have been in error in concluding that state and tribal juris-
diction is concurrent. Indeed, if they were to reach the opposite 
conclusion, the word “exclusive” in subsection (c) could mean “ex-
clusive of tribal jurisdiction” without creating a logical inconsis-
tency.  But that would still leave the conundrum within Metlakatla 
itself; the legislative intent to create concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween Metlakatla and the State of Alaska is so clear that it is im-
possible to assert that Alaska’s jurisdiction within Metlakatla is 
“exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.”231 Thus, one is ineluctably led to 
the paradoxical result that sections 1152 and 1153 have to apply 
within Metlakatla, contrary to Congress’ clear intent,232 if “exclu-
sive” in subsection (c) means “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.” 
 
 230. Letter from Sens. Ervin, Gravel and Stevens to Hon. Emanuel Celler, 
Chair, House Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 14, 1970), 116 CONG. REC. 37,354–55 (Nov. 
16, 1970). 
 231. “With respect to Metlakatla, Congress intended that state law would con-
tinue to apply but that the Metlakatla Indian community would have concurrent 
jurisdiction . . . .”  John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 810 (Alaska 1999) (Matthews, J., 
dissenting). 
 232. “Authority over major criminal offenses in the Indian community would 
remain exclusively with the State of Alaska.  It was emphasized at the hearing that 
while the State authorities would be required to handle major offenses under the 
proposed amendment just as it does now, this legislation would meet a very real 
need . . . .” 116 CONG. REC. 37,354 (Nov. 16, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Pollock). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although it is correct that the Interior Department in June 
1970 expressed the view to Congress that PL 280 had stripped Met-
lakatla of its jurisdiction, it is incorrect to conclude that this inter-
pretation was codified into statutory law by the 1970 Metlakatla 
Amendment.  First, the 1970 amendment was not necessitated by 
the question of whether PL 280 had divested Metlakatla of all ju-
risdiction, as Congress had already (through its 1968 amendments) 
given Alaska and Metlakatla the tools necessary to adjust the juris-
dictional division between them regardless of the original divesti-
ture issue. Rather, it was necessitated by the fact that only the fed-
eral government could designate Metlakatla as Indian country to 
overcome the Booth decision.  Second, the Interior Department 
did not consistently adhere to its June 1970 position that PL 280 di-
vested tribes of all jurisdiction and, in its correspondence relating 
to the change in subsection (c), took the view as early as November 
1970 (prior to passage of the amendment) that PL 280 might leave 
room for residual concurrent tribal jurisdiction (which view was re-
peated by members of Congress at the time the amendment bill 
was passed).  Third, the addition of the term “exclusive” to subsec-
tion (c) was intended to mean “exclusive of federal sections 1152 
and 1153 jurisdiction,” not “exclusive of tribal jurisdiction.” In fact, 
the opposite interpretation leads to a result clearly contrary to con-
gressional intent. 
Thus, the 1970 amendment did not transform Interior’s previ-
ous and now-disavowed divestiture interpretation into codified law; 
the wording chosen by Congress is entirely consistent with the non-
divestiture interpretation subsequently adopted by all of the PL 
280 states that have considered the issue.  The amendment left the 
Interior Department with the same capacity it had had prior to that 
amendment to reconsider and ultimately repudiate its previous in-
terpretation, which it eventually did. 
If and when the time does come for the Alaska Supreme Court 
to address the issue left unresolved by C.R.H. (i.e., whether the 
concurrent jurisdiction which the court has recognized exists be-
tween state and tribal courts over tribal members outside Indian 
country has been abrogated within Indian country by PL 280), the 
1970 Metlakatla Amendment should not present an analytical ob-
stacle to reaching the correct resolution. 
 
